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Abstract 
This paper presents new models for aggregate UK data on mortgage possessions 
(foreclosures) and mortgage arrears (payment delinquencies). The innovations include the 
treatment of difficult to observe variations in loan quality and shifts in forbearance policy by 
lenders, by common latent variables estimated in a system of equations for arrears and 
possessions, for quarterly data over 1983-2009. A second innovation is the theory-justified 
use of an estimate of the proportion of mortgages in negative equity, based on an average 
debt to equity ratio, as one of the key drivers of possessions and arrears. A third is the 
systematic treatment of measurement bias in the months in arrears measures. Finally, the 
paper does not impose a proportional long-run relationship between possessions and arrears 
assumed in the previous UK literature. A range of economic forecast scenarios for forecasts 
to 2013 reveals the sensitivity of mortgage possessions and arrears to different economic 
conditions, highlighting potential risks faced by the UK and its mortgage lenders. A 
comprehensive review of data on arrears and possessions completes the paper. 
 
Key words: foreclosures, mortgage possessions, mortgage payment delinquencies, mortgage 
arrears, UK mortgage market, defaults, unobserved components model  
JEL Classifications: G21, G28, G17, R28, R21, C51, C53, E27 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The international financial crisis of 2008/9 has had costly implications for some home-owners 
through a surge in mortgage possessions and arrears, raising political concern. However, the 
rise in problem mortgages has been less severe than in the early 1990s crisis. New research 
presents more sophisticated models than previously for UK aggregate arrears and possessions. 
Forecasting with these models, under varying scenarios to 2013, highlights possible risks 
faced by policy makers.  
 
There has been great uncertainty about the scale of the UK‟s new mortgage difficulties. The 
Council of Mortgage Lenders‟ (CML) adjusted their forecasts twice, from 75,000 mortgage 
possessions in 2009 (November, 2008), to 65,000 (June, 2009) and to 48,000 (November, 
2009). The estimated number of possessions is 46,000 for the year.
1
 The uncertainty 
concerned both the tightening of the credit market on house prices, interest rates, 
unemployment and income, and the effects of changing lending quality and policy 
interventions.  Credible models for mortgage arrears and possessions, taking account of loan 
quality and policy, which can be used to forecast future trends on alternative scenarios, should 
be invaluable to policy-makers in assessing risks ahead. Understanding the past should also 
improve long-term policy making. 
 
This paper presents new quarterly models for forecasting aggregate UK data on mortgage 
possessions (foreclosures) and mortgage arrears (payment delinquencies), revealing 
sensitivity to different economic conditions. The fundamental economic drivers of aggregate 
arrears and possessions are the debt service ratio (the product of the mortgage interest rate and 
the level of debt divided by disposable income), an estimate of the incidence of negative 
equity based on the ratio of average mortgage debt to average home prices, and the 
unemployment rate.  Together with proxies for loan quality and government policy, this 
suggests just five variables are needed to explain the history of arrears and possessions over 
1983-2009, and to assess future trends. 
 
 The paper contains several innovations. The first is to address variations in loan quality and 
shifts in forbearance policy by lenders, something which is difficult to observe, by common 
latent variables estimated in a system of equations. This method is more satisfactory than 
                                                 
1
 In May 2010, the CML revised their mortgage possession figures from Q1 2009 onwards to be 
representative of the entire first charge mortgage market. The revised figure for properties taken into 
possession in 2009 is 47,700. Earlier data relate to CML members only and so are not directly 
comparable. 
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widely used of loan-to-value measures for first mortgages, which are not comparable over 
time and omit further advances.  The second is the theory-justified use of an estimate of the 
proportion of mortgages in negative equity, calibrated to micro data, and based on the ratio of 
average debt to average equity.  The third is the systematic treatment of measurement bias in 
the available “months-in-arrears” measures, previously neglected. Finally, the assumption in 
previous studies of a proportional relationship between possessions and arrears is relaxed. 
 
A careful study of the aggregate data is pertinent in the UK given the paucity of micro data on 
mortgage defaults (by contrast with the US). The only micro-candidate for a random sample 
is the British Household Panel Study (BHPS).  These data are sparse and not timely, however, 
and there are major problems drawing aggregate implications from them.
2
  
 
Fluctuations in UK possessions and arrears rates are shown in Figures 1 and 2, using data 
from the CML
 3
.  The flow into possessions peaks in 1991, at a quarterly rate of 0.2 of one 
percent of the number of mortgages. From the subsequent trough in 2004 to 2008 the 
possessions rate has traced out just over half the previous rise from 1989 to 1991.  The arrears 
rate peaked in 1993 (proportions of mortgages with greater than 6 months or greater than 12 
months payment arrears), lagging significantly behind the 1991 possessions peak. The lag can 
partly be attributed to a shift in government policy and coordinated efforts by mortgage 
lenders from the end of 1991 (Muellbauer and Cameron, 1997).
4
 The policy shift reduced the 
possessions rate, but mortgages in arrears rose. There are strong parallels between these and 
later government interventions and discussions with lenders towards greater leniency, in 
2008-9.
5
  
 
An alternative data source from the Ministry of Justice records the court possessions actions 
and orders made for England and Wales. In Figure 3 these are plotted as a fraction of the 
number of UK mortgages outstanding.  The court actions data show a dramatic drop in the 
last quarter of 2008, confirming the forbearance policy shift by lenders. This was undoubtedly 
related to the Mortgage Pre-action Protocol.  It is likely that part of the effect of the policy 
                                                 
2
 The BHPS sample under-represents some types of households; the possessions data are too sparse to 
make full use the panel structure (see Cooper and Meen, 2001); some variables are poorly measured; 
and the history is too short to identify complex time-varying influences, such as policy variations. 
3
 Available data on UK mortgage possessions and arrears is documented in Annex 1. 
4
 Policies included the shift to direct payment of income support to mortgage lenders and a Stamp Duty 
holiday, in return for a collective agreement by lenders to be more lenient. 
5
 The recent policy shifts include more generous Support for Mortgage Interest, the application of the 
Mortgage Pre-action Protocol from November 2008, the Mortgage Rescue Scheme, and Homeowners 
Mortgage Support (see Stephens (2009) for a summary of these measures). Indirect recent policy 
support includes another Stamp Duty holiday and mortgage loan targets for lenders owned by tax-
payers (Northern Rock), or partly owned (Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds TSB), to underpin 
mortgage availability and house prices. 
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shift was to postpone possessions, though the magnitude of this effect is unknown.  The court 
orders data experienced a larger proportionate rise from 2004 to 2008 (though with a drop in 
the last quarter of 2008) than the CML possessions rate data, which tend to lag behind.  The 
court actions and orders data are consistent with the stabilization in the possessions rate in 
2009.   
 
There are, however, differences between the recent economic downturn and that of the early 
1990s, the most radical being in the monetary policy response in rapidly bringing down 
interest rates.  In 1990-92, monetary policy was constrained by the high rate of inflation, and 
sterling‟s membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism until the UK exited in 
September, 1992. The average cost of servicing mortgage debt as measured by the debt 
service ratio has thus fallen in 2009 to below early 1990s levels, despite far higher levels of 
mortgage debt relative to income. The rises in the unemployment rate and in the average debt 
equity ratio are more comparable to the previous downturn (see Figure 4). 
 
The next section develops a model for the economic drivers of possessions and arrears using a 
double trigger framework for defaults and payment delinquencies, and surveys empirical 
work. In section 3, the methodology and data issues are discussed. The fourth section presents 
results for a joint estimation of arrears and possessions with proxy functions for lending 
quality and policy shifts, and forecasts to the end of 2013. Section 5 concludes. A 
comprehensive review of data on arrears and possessions completes the paper (Annex 1). 
 
2.  The Economic Drivers of Possessions and Arrears 
 
2.1  Conceptual Framework: the Double Trigger Model for Defaults 
 
There is general agreement that mortgage defaults or possessions result from some mix of 
excessive debt relative to home equity and cash flow problems.  This is consistent with the 
„double trigger‟ approach, a more general view of mortgage possession than the option 
pricing approach popular in some of the US literature, see Kau et al. (1992) and Deng et al. 
(2000), and applied to UK data by Ncube and Satchell (1994). In the option pricing model, 
default is chosen by the household once housing equity falls below the mortgage debt level by 
a given percentage, which depends mainly on house price uncertainty. Even in the US, where 
mortgages in many states are non-recourse loans (i.e. where the lender's rights are restricted to 
the equity in the home, excluding recourse to the borrower‟s income or other assets), doubt 
has been cast on this „ruthless default‟ literature (Vandell, 1995). Recent empirical literature 
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adopts a more general approach that encompasses cash flow problems, for example, Gerrardi 
et al. (2008) and Foote et al. (2008). 
 
A thorough early exposition of the double trigger model is by Elmer and Seelig (1998). A 
recent exposition and application to US micro data on sub-prime mortgages is by Bajari et al. 
(2009).  They argue that, abstracting from variations in interest rates, default for household i 
at time t, due to a weak net equity position, occurs when 
 
it it it
log mortgagedebt / equity   c                                                                          (1) 
 
where the threshold cit  depends positively on the expected growth rate of house prices, given 
transactions delays, and also on house price volatility (Bajari et al. (2009), equation (4), p.10). 
They argue that when interest rates can change, cit depends additionally on an interest rate 
term (equation (10), p. 13).  Default due to a weak net equity position can occur even if the 
household does not have cash flow problems. This is particularly relevant in the US where, in 
states such as California, borrowers have a „walk away‟ option so that their liability is confined 
to the value of the home.  
 
Default can also occur because of cash flow problems induced by credit constraints, when a 
function of the debt service ratio exceeds a threshold.  Bajari et al. argue that this function 
depends also on the credit worthiness of the household, its employment status and its 
expected income growth (their equation (13), p.15).  This can be expressed by a trigger 
function being positive:  
 
e
it it it it
f (debt service ratio ,  ur ,  cs ,  y )  0                                                              (2) 
 
where ur is the household‟s unemployment rate, cs its credit score and ye represents its 
expected income growth. Bajari et al. embed condition (1) in a stochastic utility model, so that 
if the utility associated with this type of default is positive, the household will default.  
Condition (2) is treated as an aspect of the budget constraint, outside the control of the 
household.  Default then occurs if either or both conditions are fulfilled.  This is modelled as a 
bivariate probit, given some unobserved stochastic components reflecting tastes and 
household characteristics. 
 
There is a problem with this formulation. It makes little sense for a household with positive 
net housing equity to default, even when there are cash flow problems.  With positive equity, 
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such households may have refinancing possibilities or could sell the home rather than lose it 
through possession.  It seems more plausible that default condition (2) should be replaced by:  
 
e
it it it it
it it 0   
f (debtservice ratio ,  ur ,  cs ,  y )  0    
    log mortgage debt / equity  c
t
and
                                                             (3) 
                       
The parameter c0t is likely to be negative since significant positive equity is likely to be 
needed for refinancing, while transactions costs need to be covered when selling. Then default 
occurs if either condition (1) and/or condition (3) are fulfilled. This differs from the 
either/and or condition specified by Bajari et al. since it suggests that problems with debt 
relative to equity are present in all defaults. 
 
Given individual heterogeneity and knowledge of (or assumptions on) the distributions of the 
observables (such as the debt/equity ratio) and of the unobservables (such as tastes) at the 
micro level, one could obtain the aggregate proportion of defaults as a function of the means 
of the observables and of the parameters of the distributions. Without knowledge of the 
distributions of observables and unobservables, the functional form of the relationship 
between the aggregate proportion of defaults and the means of the observables is unknown, 
but in general will be non-linear.  Specifically, there is an important common element in 
conditions (1) and (3) involving a threshold for log (mortgage debt/equity). Although c0t is 
expected to be a little below zero (e.g. from transactions costs), while option pricing theory 
implies cit would be a little above zero, the proportions of households satisfying each 
condition should be highly correlated with the proportion in negative equity (the proportion 
for whom log (mortgage debt/equity) exceeds zero).  
 
On specific assumptions, it is possible to derive a simple relationship between the proportion of 
households with negative equity, and mean debt and mean equity. Suppose, for example, that 
debt and equity have log-normal distributions, so that the log (mortgage debt/equity) is also 
normally distributed. The proportion of mortgages with negative equity, i.e. log (mortgage 
debt/equity) greater than zero, is then given by the normal distribution function F(μ, σ; 0), with 
the mean of log (mortgage debt/equity)  denoted by μ and its standard deviation by σ.  This is 
shown in Figure 5.  As the mean of the distribution shifts to the right, the area under the tail 
increases proportionately more than does the mean. For the log-normal distribution, there is a 
simple relationship between the mean of log debt, which we do not observe, and the log of mean 
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debt, which we do observe; and, correspondingly for the mean of log equity.
6
 The logistic 
function is a good approximation to the normal, with a distribution function implying: 
 
 
0
proportion of negative equity
                         =  1 / (1 exp(  (mean logdebt/equity))
                         =  1 / (1 exp(  (log(mean debt/mean equity) ))
        (4)     
where λ0 is
 
half the difference in the variances of log debt and log equity.  Given data on the ratio 
of mean debt to mean equity, and estimates based on micro data of the proportion of households 
with negative equity, the coefficients λ and λ0 can be calibrated to match the estimated proportion 
of negative equity to the micro data.  This equation should yield a good time-series 
approximation to the most important non-linearity in the relationship between the aggregate rate 
of possessions and the means of its fundamental drivers. A further advantage is that if later 
estimates of negative equity based on micro data become available, the relationship could be 
recalibrated for improved accuracy.  
 
In the UK, unlike the US, it is probable that relatively few possessions cases arise through 
condition (1) since the consequences of possession are more painful. Mortgage borrowers can be 
pursued for up to six years for negative equity remaining after the lender has sold off a home in 
possession (by contrast with non-recourse mortgage loans and „walk away‟ options in the US).  
 
The probability associated with condition (3) can be written as the product of the probability of 
„bad (debt/equity)‟ and the probability of a „bad trigger‟ given „bad (debt/equity)‟. Modelling the 
log of the probability, i.e. the log possessions rate, results in an additive model.  If the two events 
in condition (3) were independent, the log possessions rate would be given by a function of 
(debt/equity) plus a function of the means of the variables appearing in the trigger function, i.e. 
the debt service ratio, unemployment etc..  A log-linear formulation can thus be used in which 
the log possessions rate is driven by the log of the unemployment rate, the log of the debt service 
ratio and the log of the imputed proportion with negative equity. In addition, without data on the 
aggregate credit score, an aggregate loan quality indicator is needed (section 3.3.2). 
 
The reasoning just set out for modelling the possessions rate can be adapted for modelling 
mortgage arrears or „payment delinquencies‟. As noted in section 2.2, the US literature is here 
sparser than that on possessions.     The count of mortgages exceeding a threshold level of arrears 
(such as 6 months of regular payments, or 5 percent of mortgage debt.) measured relative to the 
total number of mortgages, should be governed by a less stringent version of condition (2). The 
                                                 
6
 It is well-known that if X is log normally distributed, then log EX=E log X + 0.5Var log X = μ + 0.5σ2. 
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debt equity ratio is also important for determining the arrears count. The outflow from an arrears 
count above a given threshold enters one of four states: possession; partial (or full) repayment in 
order for arrears levels to fall below the threshold; the sale of the property; or refinancing.  The 
last two options may be blocked by low net equity.  Thus, the proportion of mortgages in 
negative equity is likely to have a significant effect on the arrears count.  The relative importance 
of the cash flow drivers, however, the debt service ratio and unemployment, is likely to dominate 
the proportion in negative equity in the arrears equation, particularly for lower arrears thresholds. 
While a poor debt equity ratio is a necessary condition for possession for rational households, 
arrears can arise without the household necessarily being close to negative equity. 
 
2.2  Empirical Survey on Models of Possessions and Arrears 
 
By contrast with an extensive US empirical literature on borrower mortgage default or lender 
foreclosure (possession or repossession), and the more modest contribution on borrower 
payment delinquency (arrears), the set of UK empirical studies on possession and arrears is 
strikingly limited. Comprehensive reviews of the earlier US literature into the 1990s on 
mortgage default and delinquency by Quercia and Stegman (1992), and a special focus on 
empirical testing of option theoretic models of default by Vandell (1995), reveal a wealth of 
micro-data based studies
7
 from both lender and borrower perspectives. The paucity and 
limited quality of corresponding micro-data sets in the UK has constrained the types of 
analyses that can be carried out. This largely accounts for the small number of predominantly 
macro-based empirical studies that employ a hybrid of the recent default/delinquency theories 
in reduced form regression models. 
 
A small set of UK studies using varied data sets adopts a disaggregated approach (Table 1). 
Muellbauer and Cameron (1997) and Cooper and Meen (2001) use the CML database and 
regional possession court orders for England and Wales to explore the determinants of 
regional possessions. Lambrecht et al. (1997, 2003) employ a proprietorial data set supplied 
by a mortgage insurance company. Their earlier study extends the traditional option theoretic 
approach to examine both ability-to-pay and equity variables influencing default, finding that 
the former variables have more influence on default than the latter. Their 2003 study 
examines similar influences over the timing of delinquency and voluntary and forced 
possessions, using a hazard model. The loan-to-value ratio was positively associated with 
                                                 
7
 Examples of the underlying data sets include individual/family loans and their characteristics from 
Freddie Mac, Federal Housing Administration, Department of Veteran Affairs, Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, Morgan Guarantee Insurance Corporation and other banking institutions or institutional 
bodies (e.g. Mortgage Bankers Association) or Savings and Loans by US state. Panel data sets of 
income dynamics e.g. by the University of Michigan have also been employed.  
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time to default; this was rationalized by the increased use of second mortgages, when initial 
loan-to-value ratios were low, with a higher probability of default. The sample used is not 
random, however, consisting only of a set of defaulting borrowers; and the available data limit 
the borrower characteristics to the loan-to-value ratio, salary, marital status and the interest 
rate, all measured at point of mortgage origination (the ensuing drawbacks are discussed by 
Cooper and Meen (2001)). The theoretical and empirical ambiguities of the role of loan-to-
value ratios in such micro studies are replicated in macro studies, discussed below. 
 
The Survey of English Housing (SEH), operating since 1993, covers about 20,000 
households, and is a series of cross-sections not a panel. It is rich in information on individual 
characteristics, but is not suitable to analyse trigger events (Cooper and Meen (2001)). 
Burrows (1998) use the SEH to analyse mortgage arrears with a logit model, as a function of 
borrower and lender characteristics, measured not at time of origination or default but in the 
current sample wave. Several studies use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), an 
annual survey since 1991, covering approximately 10,000 individuals in 5,000 households 
(extended since 1999). Also rich in individual characteristics, the default coverage of the 
BHPS is in practice miniscule, further affected by sample attrition, so that pooling of 
observations is necessary for econometric analysis.  Even with pooling, Cooper and Meen 
suggest that a focus on owner-occupiers alone would generate only 46 default observations 
(during 1991-2000). The individual data, on the other hand, allows the examination of trigger 
events such as loss of income or divorce.  A study of evictions and possessions by Boheim 
and Taylor (2000) for 1991-97, across all tenures (to increase the number of default 
observations), offers some evidence for the importance of negative equity, unemployment 
and its duration, and family size and tenure. The effect of Mortgage Payment Protection 
Insurance (MPPI) on arrears
8
, insignificant in their study, is further explored in Battacharjee 
et al. (2009), using the BHPS.  
 
Brief Overview of the US Literature on Default and Delinquency 
 
The evolution of mortgage default studies in the US is characterised by Quercia and Stegman 
(1992) in a typology of three generations or sets of studies. The earliest work on default and 
delinquency risk rates from the 1960s onwards focused from a lender’s perspective on simple 
correlations or empirical regression models capturing, at loan origination, the characteristics 
                                                 
8
 Mortgage protection policies have been somewhat controversial - some lenders and insurance 
companies have been accused of selling expensive policies with fine print that excludes risks that 
borrowers thought they were protected against.  Conceivably, their more widespread use could have 
reduced the impact of unemployment on arrears and possessions.   
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of the mortgages (e.g. loan-to-value ratio, interest rate and mortgage term) and of borrowers 
(e.g. family size, location, marital status, junior financing and characteristics of employment) 
that might be correlated with later default. 
 
A second generation of empirical models derived from theoretical models that instead 
emphasised factors influencing the borrowers’ decisions on payment, prepayment, 
delinquency or default. Couched in a utility maximising framework, such models allow four 
alternative choices at each payment period, where the chosen outcome maximises utility over 
time, given the borrower‟s circumstances. A special case is the large literature on option 
theoretic models from the mid-1980s, in its simplest form abstracting from transactions costs 
(“frictionless” models), where prepayment is treated as a call option and default as a put 
option in a competitive market. Such models predict immediate default if a property‟s value 
drops to the level of the mortgage value minus a small margin depending on house price 
volatility (“ruthless default”, Vandell, 1995).9  These models emphasise the financial aspects 
of the decision via negative equity, and borrower characteristics are excluded. Thus, such 
frictionless models predict identical default behaviour for borrowers with similar mortgages 
and houses. Much of the empirical literature, however, has explored the evidence for “default 
under-exercise” rather than “ruthless default”, whereby the default decision is delayed on 
reaching sufficiently negative equity. Some studies rationalise such evidence by transactions 
costs, such as from moving house, and by future credit restrictions (e.g. Kau et al., 1993). 
Others suggest a role for “trigger events” (Riddiough, 1991), or crises affecting income, such 
as divorce or loss of employment, that when intersecting with marginal equity, may 
precipitate the move from a delinquent state with negative equity, to default. This introduces a 
role for ability to pay factors in addition to equity. The evidence on both sides of the “ruthless 
default” was summarized by Vandell (1995), who stressed, inter alia, a better empirical 
understanding of the role of trigger events through improved micro-data sets and analyses of 
mortgage case studies, of credit constraints and solvency, of the functional forms of various 
transactions costs, and of lender influences on default and delinquency. 
 
The so-called third generation of models mainly represent a technological improvement on 
the second generation models in applying proportional hazard models to estimate default 
probabilities, and utilizing a measure of mortgage risk that better reflects lenders concerns: 
expected mortgage loss
10
 rather than default rates, as in most second generation studies.   
                                                 
9
 Even within the option theoretic model, however, it may not be optimal to default immediately that 
negative equity is reached if there are possibilities to default in the future which could be more 
valuable, given volatile prices. 
10
  Mortgage loss varies with the size of the loan, and this is not picked up when using default rates. 
10 
 
 
The predominant theoretical model in the literature stems from the second and third 
generational research, finding an important role for net equity in default risk, but also some 
evidence for borrower effects and transactions costs, though these effects are less well 
understood (two examples focused on the sub-prime crisis are Gerardi et al. (2008) and Bajari 
et al. (2008)). However, as Bajari et al. makes clear, the neglected factors of lending quality 
or credit constraints do not find an obvious place in the utility-maximising framework 
underlying second generational and option theoretical models. These require an extension to 
such models, see section 2.1 for discussion. 
  
Studies on delinquency are far fewer, mainly due to the difficulty in modelling the 
delinquency decision, not easily set within the option theoretic model unless a competing risk 
model is contemplated (Quercia and Stegman, 1992). These authors contend that the analysis 
of default should be in a framework that incorporates the delinquency decision, and, instead 
of treating these two decisions as distinct alternatives, they should be sequential and related.  
 
UK Macro-studies on Arrears and Possessions   
 
The UK macro-literature is summarized in Table 1
11
. The few macro-analyses in the UK are 
more often of arrears outcomes (e.g. Whitley et al., 2004; Figueira et al., 2005). Of those that 
treat possessions, these tend to be sequential or simultaneous models with arrears (e.g. 
Breedon and Joyce, 1992; Brookes et al., 1994; Allen and Milne, 1994; and Cooper and Meen, 
2001). Brookes et al. (1994) and some others (e.g. Figueira et al.) base their possessions 
model on the analysis of Wadhwani (1986) for the frequency of corporate bankruptcies, but 
applied to mortgage default. Brookes et al. employ a utility maximizing consumption 
framework for arrears, with un-withdrawn equity
12
 and ability to pay variables, plus a 
measure of gearing of first-time buyers to capture the vulnerability of borrowers.  
 
When modelling possessions conditional on arrears, all authors impose the constraint that in the 
long run, the flow of possessions moves in proportion to the number of households in long-term 
arrears. This is a questionable restriction:  while most possessions cases are preceded by arrears, 
most arrears cases do not end in possession. Notably, the non-linearity linking the debt equity 
ratio with defaults is neglected in all aggregate UK studies. Moreover, shifts in lenders‟ 
                                                 
11
 There are other types of quantitative study e.g. by Ford (1993), who analyses borrower 
characteristics of possessions and in arrears using data from one major lender. 
12
 Unwithdrawn equity is measured by Brookes et al. as net equity divided by the number of mortgages.  
Post-sample, their measure would thus have risen far more than the arrears rate.  Figueira et al. (2005) 
use the ratio of net equity to the stock of debt, but define the debt service ratio as mortgage payments 
divided by real, as opposed to nominal personal disposable income. 
11 
 
forbearance policy, shifts in credit constraints and changing lending quality are usually 
omitted, though some of the dummies used by Cooper and Meen (2001) can be interpreted 
this way. Indeed, econometric studies of aggregate mortgage possession data, such as 
Breedon and Joyce (1992), Brookes et al. (1994) and Allen and Milne (1994), estimated on 
data up to 1990 or 1991, break down on later data. There is some treatment of credit factors: 
Whitley et al. (2004) in modelling arrears with similar variables find a role for competing 
unsecured borrowing (via credit card arrears). A rise in the loan-to-value ratio for first-time 
buyers reduces the level of arrears in the short run, suggesting that the loan-to-value ratio acts 
as a proxy for refinancing opportunities for those facing risk of delinquencies. The short-run 
role of the loan-to-value ratio as a proxy for refinancing opportunities and its long-run role as 
a proxy for one aspect of lending quality (with opposite signed effects), can produce 
apparently contradictory findings in different studies with loan-to-value controls.  
 
3. Empirical specification, methodology and data issues 
 
Empirical models for possessions and arrears are motivated by the double trigger approach 
outlined in section 2.1. The modelling methodology is described in section 3.1 and data issues 
in section 3.2. The models utilize dummy-based equations capturing difficult to measure 
institutional changes in lending quality and policy. The timing and shapes of these 
institutional dummies are discussed in section 3.3.  
 
3.1 Modelling methodology 
 
The models for possessions and arrears are formulated in an equilibrium correction form, 
illustrated as follows for the log possessions rate: 
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1 1 0
1
log  ( log )
log              
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k
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poss a a a X LQ PS poss X
c poss PS
     (5) 
 
The dependent variable is the quarterly change in the log possessions rate.
13
  The equilibrium 
correction term is defined in terms of levels of the key drivers in a vector X of variables, and 
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 The log formulation, used in our models, has the advantage of plausible multiplicative effects, but 
may exaggerate movements at low levels of possessions, e.g. in 2004, unless the explanatory variables 
similarly reflect these extremes. We find, however, that the log of the estimated proportion of 
mortgages with negative equity, together with the log of the debt service ratio, does an excellent job in 
capturing these low levels. 
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the loan quality and policy functions, LQ  and PS . The speed of adjustment to long run 
equilibrium is a4. The long-run relationship between the log possessions rate and the long-run 
X variables, loan quality and policy function is thus: 
 
 
0
1
log ( )           
n
l l
l
poss a a X LQ PS                                                       (6) 
 
 The set of X variables includes an estimate for the proportion of mortgages in negative equity 
(see equation (4)), the log mean debt service ratio, the log unemployment rate and potentially 
a measure of mortgage arrears. Note that among the short-run effects,, tPS  appears with a 
unit coefficient.  This imposes the testable restriction that the short and long-run effects of 
policy are identical.  
 
It is important to distinguish between two types of policy shifts. First, forbearance exercised 
by lenders and the courts lowers possessions, other things being equal, but raises arrears (see 
examples in section 3.3). The second type of policy shift relaxes the economic constraints 
faced by households, for example by making income support more generous, hence shifting 
possessions and arrears in the same direction. The formulation and empirical identification of 
the dummies which represent policy shifts and lending quality are discussed in section 3.3. 
 
The arrears models have a broadly similar structure to the possessions equation (5), and are 
applied to data on the proportion of mortgages that are more than 6 months and more than 12 
months in arrears. There are two key differences from the possessions equation: the first 
concerns the role of policy, which has the opposite-signed effect on arrears from that on 
possessions; the second arises from the correction of a bias from the commonly used 
“months-in-arrears” measure. 
 
Beginning with forbearance policy, two channels affecting arrears must be distinguished. One 
arises from a stock-flow relationship with possessions. If all possession cases were previously 
at least 6 months in arrears, then a reduction in the number of possessions cases should raise 
the arrears count by a similar number, other things being equal. To be more precise, the 
change in the count of any measure of arrears equals the inflow minus the outflow of arrears.  
The total outflow consists of the „good‟ outflow into repayment or refinancing, and the „bad‟ 
outflow into possessions.  Suppose that (inflow into arrears – „good‟ outflow from 
arrears)/(stock of arrearst-1)  is a function of a vector Z, F(Z).  Hence  
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1 1
total change in arrears /arrears ( ) flow into possession / arrears
t t t t t
F Z              (7)               
          
Hence approximately, 
 
 1logarrears  ( ) –  flow into possession / arrearst t t tF Z                                  (8) 
 
As a result, the ratio of negative possessions to lagged arrears was included in each arrears 
equation to account for this link between possessions and arrears.
14
    
 
The second channel where policy on possessions affects arrears is via a demonstration or 
incentive effect.  The knowledge that lenders and courts are exercising forbearance makes 
borrowers less concerned about the risk that a rise in their arrears levels will induce 
possession.  For example, borrowers with this belief may pay off credit card debt before 
mortgage debt, or may cut back less on other household expenditure.  The parameter    
6b  
(note the negative sign) where 
6
b  is positive, captures the incentive effect of increased 
forbearance on arrears. The formulation in the equation below also allows a lag in the 
operation of this effect when  takes a value below 1.   
 
The two policy effects are shown in an arrears equation corresponding to equation (5), for a 
percentage of arrears measure, arr* (e.g. a count of arrears cases where ratio of arrears to 
mortgage debt exceeds say 5 percent): 
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Correcting the bias from the “months-in-arrears” measure is discussed next. It is unfortunate 
that a long history of arrears data is available only for a count of arrears measured as “months 
in arrears” (those with an accumulated level of arrears in excess of an equivalent number of 
months of normal payments).  When mortgage rates fall, normal payments fall and 
unfortunately the “months-in-arrears” count rises15.   
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 Since it is likely that some possessions arise before arrears reach the 12-month level, the 12-month 
arrears equation uses 0.8 of the ratio of possessions to lagged arrears. 
15
 With a 25 year conventional repayment mortgage, at a 7.5 percent mortgage rate, being 2.5 percent 
in arrears (e.g. arrears of £2500 on a £100,000 loan) translates into being 3.3 months in arrears (see 
14 
 
 
A bias correction based on the log debt service ratio is used to convert a relationship 
formulated for arr* (a count of arrears by the ratio of arrears to mortgage debt) into one for 
arrm (a count by months).
16
  We approximate the relationship between the two measures in 
equation (10):  
 
log * log log              
t t t
arr a arrm dsr
    (10)
 
 
where arrm is the month in arrears count which best matches the percentage in arrears count 
represented by arr*, and θ log dsr proxies the measurement bias. The parameter θ will differ 
for 6-month and 12-month arrears rates, see discussion in section 4.1.  By substituting 
equation (10) into equation (9), we obtain an equilibrium correction model for the proportion 
of mortgages measure by “months-in-arrears”:  
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 The equation specifications (5) and (11) have a general lag structure in the dynamic terms.   
With two arrears measures, there are three equations in all, jointly estimated imposing cross-
equation constraints through the common LQ and PS functions. There is much heterogeneity 
in individual circumstances, including the timing of the initial mortgage, and in behaviour by 
lenders and the courts. This suggests that fluctuations in debt service ratios and in the 
proportion of mortgages in negative equity have long, drawn-out effects in aggregate that 
could be well-represented by moving averages of these variables.  The evidence pointed to the 
relevance of four-quarter moving averages of the log debt service ratio and of the negative 
equity indicator in parsimonious models, for both possessions and arrears. These formulations 
were incorporated in the three-equation system, and tested against more general lag structures.  
                                                                                                                                            
CML information notes on release of arrears data, e.g. February 20, 2009).  For a similar interest-only 
mortgage, the number of months in arrears is higher at 4 months, as monthly payments do not 
incorporate a repayment element. If the current interest rate falls and so the regular monthly payments, 
the accumulated arrears translate into a higher monthly payment equivalent at the new lower interest 
rate, and months in arrears rises. With a lower 4.5 percent interest rate, being 2.5 percent in arrears 
translates into 4.4 months for a conventional mortgage, and 6.7 months for an interest only mortgage. 
This pushes more existing cases into the 3-6 months and the 6-12 months in arrears categories.  
16
 Basing the bias correction on log of the tax-adjusted mortgage rate instead of the log debt service 
ratio gives closely similar results for the arrears equations and jointly estimated possessions equation.    
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3.2 Data issues 
 
3.2.1 Interpolation of bi-annual data 
 
CML publishes quarterly data for arrears, possessions and the outstanding mortgage stock, 
beginning in 2008. Half-yearly data for earlier years can be interpolated into quarterly data 
from the early 1980s, and linked to unpublished quarterly data from CML from 1999Q1. The 
interpolation for arrears, which are stock data, is straightforward, as a smoothed step-function. 
The H1 value is given to Q1 and Q2 and the H2 value to Q3 and Q4. Then logs are taken and 
a two-quarter moving average is taken of the log values. For the flow of possessions, the 
interpolation is a bit more complex. The quarterly data are created and scaled using H1 and 
H2 biannual data (scaling ensures that the total of the implied quarterly flows into possession 
add up to the published biannual data).
17
 
 
3.2.2 Measuring the debt-equity ratio and negative equity. 
 
One commonly used definition of the ratio of mortgage debt to housing equity measures 
equity by the estimated value of the residential housing stock owned by the household sector 
(as published in the National Income and Expenditure Blue Book, and interpolated to a 
quarterly frequency).  A substantial proportion of owners of housing equity, however, have no 
mortgages. We prefer, therefore, to adopt a measure defined as the average mortgage for 
those with mortgages relative to the average house price. We take the mix-adjusted index of 
second-hand house prices, normalized to the average value of houses traded in some year, as a 
proxy for the average house price of mortgaged properties.    
 
An estimate of the proportion of mortgages in negative equity can be derived from the average 
debt equity ratio, using equation (4).  The coefficients λ and λ0 can be calibrated approximately to 
match estimates of the proportion of households with negative equity. CML research (Tatch 
2009) suggests that between 7.6 percent and 10 percent of UK mortgages were in negative equity 
in February 2009 (using Halifax and Nationwide house price indices, respectively, for the fall in 
UK house prices between December and February).  CML previously estimated a peak of 17 
percent of mortgages with negative equity in the early 1990s.  A figure of 9 percent is assumed 
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 Q1 t = H2t-1/6+ H1t/3, scaled by H1t /(Q1t +Q2 t); Q2 t = H1t/3+H2t/6, scaled by H1t /(Q1t +Q2 t); Q3 t 
= H1t/6+ H2t/3, scaled by H2t /(Q3t +Q4 t); and Q4 t = H2t/3+ H1t+1/6, scaled by H2t /(Q3t +Q4 t) . 
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for 2009Q1 and 15.5 percent for 1995Q4, to calibrate λ and λ0.
18
 The debt equity ratio defined by 
the average mortgage to average house price is plotted in Figure 6, with the implied proportion in 
negative equity from equation (4).  The calibration implies 9 percent of mortgages were in 
negative equity in 2009Q1 compared with 1.5 percent in 2002Q4 and 15.5 percent in 1995Q4. 
Comparable figures at the same dates for the debt equity ratio were 71.4 percent, 51.6 percent 
and 77.9 percent. Moves in the proportion in negative equity become more pronounced as the 
average debt equity ratio rises, due to the non-linearity of their relationship, see equation (4).  
 
One further small adjustment is made in the assumed relationship between negative equity and 
the ratio of average debt to average equity.  It seems likely that a high number of recent 
possessions would have temporarily depleted the count of mortgages in negative equity, below 
those implied by the average debt-equity ratio.  To take account of this, we subtract the 
cumulated number of possessions cases over the previous two years
19
, scaled by the number of 
mortgages outstanding, from the proportion of negative equity implied by equation (4).  
 
3.3 Use of dummies to proxy policy shifts and lending standards 
  
3.3.1 Policy shifts 
 
Table 2 explains the dating of forbearance and other policy shifts, and the expected effects on 
possessions and arrears. The model described above incorporates both the stock-flow 
measurement and the incentive effects of forbearance policy on arrears.  The incentive effect 
operates through a forbearance policy function which is a simple function of dummy 
variables.  The first is a step dummy equal to one from 1992Q1 and zero before.  This reflects 
the December 1991 policy response to the mounting possessions crisis with an agreement 
between mortgage lenders and the government.  The government acceded to the lenders‟ 
request to pay income support for mortgage interest direct to the lenders and also announced a 
Stamp Duty holiday, while lenders agreed to greater leniency on possessions.   After 1995, it 
seems likely that a gradual return began toward more standard behaviour since, in that year, 
the government substantially reduced the generosity of SMI, despite lender criticism. We use 
smoothed step dummies (described further in section 3.3.2) for 1995 to 1997 to capture this 
return to normal, imposing the restriction that the 1991 shift is eventually cancelled out. 
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 We take λ=7 and λ0  = - 0.001*(t-40)+ 0.04.  The slight drift in λ0 with time improves the match with 
estimates of negative equity. 
19
 The average debt equity ratio eventually captures attrition from possession since defaults by 
vulnerable cases reduce the average debt equity ratio for the remaining mortgages. In the short term, 
removal of negative equity cases through possession will temporarily reduce the negative equity count 
by more. Limiting the adjustment to the previous two years captures the temporary nature of the effect. 
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In 2008Q4, forbearance policy shifted again, with government pressure on lenders – some of 
whom the government saved from bankruptcy and so partially owned – to exercise generosity.  
The industry‟s mortgage code of practice was also tightened through the Mortgage Pre-action 
Protocol.  The latter shift would have introduced delay on possessions procedures, and implies a 
partial reversal after a few quarters of the initial impact of the policy shift.  A step dummy 
beginning in 2008Q4 and two and three quarter lags of this dummy capture these possibilities. As 
noted above, while the possessions equation enforces the same short-run and long-run effects of 
the policy function, the arrears equations allow for a lag since it is plausible that incentive effects 
do not operate instantaneously.  
 
3.3.2 Lending quality  
 
Lending quality is difficult to measure directly. Since 1968, micro data have been collected 
from mortgage lenders on loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios.  The UK literature on 
arrears and possessions has used these as indicators of lending quality or credit availability or 
both. These indicators cannot be pure measures of lending quality as they are endogenous and 
depend also on interest rates, house prices, incomes and other factors (Fernandez-Corugedo 
and Muellbauer, 2006). Moreover, the available data are not fully comparable over time.  The 
original survey, based on a five percent sample of building society mortgages, became 
unrepresentative of the market as the banks entered the mortgage market from 1980, and as 
centralized mortgage lenders increased their share of the market from the mid-1980s. The 
latter suffered possessions rates around three times as large as those of high street banks and 
building societies, Ford et al. (1995). Coverage was extended to the banks from 1992 in the 
Survey of Mortgage Lenders (SML), but not to the centralized mortgage lenders. Sample 
coverage after 2002 included full electronic records from some lenders, see Tatch (2003); 
there may have been problems, however, in classifying borrowers into first-time and repeat 
buyers.  The new Regulated Mortgage Survey (RMS) was introduced in 2005 with a larger 
coverage of types of lender. There was jump in the fraction of high loan-to-value loans 
recorded for first-time buyers, and other differences with the SML, Tatch (2006).  These data 
capture only first mortgages, omitting second mortgages and the home equity loans that later 
added to mortgage debt (LaCour-Little et al. (2009) give US evidence on the relevance of 
such further loans). The data do not fully capture the quality of the screening carried out by 
lenders.  The shares of self-certification and of securitized mortgages rose sharply in 2005-7 
(Turner (2009)), and such mortgages have shown higher default rates more recently. 
 
18 
 
These are the reasons why this paper prefers to use a latent variable, common to all three 
equations, based on dummies, to capture changes in loan quality.  „Loan quality‟ affects 
possessions and arrears rates in the same direction but must necessarily do so with a 
considerable lag.  „Loan quality‟ does not measure the quality of loans at the time they were 
issued, but rather the later impact of quality change on possessions and arrears.  Two other 
effects will be reflected by this loan quality indicator.  The first of these is from altered access 
to credit.  It is typical that a period of poor quality lending with high defaults will affect bank 
balance sheets and generate more cautious lenders.  This will constrain the refinancing route 
out of payment difficulties.  For instance, a dummy reflecting earlier poor quality lending 
from 1989 and from 2007 will additionally capture reduced refinancing opportunities.  The 
second effect derives from improvements in income support to those with payment difficulties 
that affect arrears and possessions in the same direction and comprise part of the „loan 
quality‟ function. Examples are the policy shifts announced in 2008, offering more generous 
income support for the unemployed with mortgages and those already on Pension Credit and 
Income Support, and the Mortgage Rescue Scheme.
20
 
 
Lending standards evolve more slowly than policy and have gradual effects on mortgage 
defaults; heterogeneity of individual borrowers and of lender behaviour results in smoothness 
in aggregate default rates in responding to shocks.  A double moving average of step dummies 
is a good potential proxy for loan quality. For example define a step dummy sd89 which is 
zero up to 1988Q4 and one from 1989Q1.  The four-quarter moving average of this, termed 
sd89ma, takes the value 0.25 in 1989Q1, 0.5 in 1989Q2, 0.75 in 1989Q3 and 1 in 1989Q4.  
Now take a five-quarter moving average of sd89ma, termed sd89mm.  This rises in an „S-
shape‟ from zero in 1988Q4 to reach one in 1990Q4. Linear combinations of such double 
moving averages of step dummies provide a simple way of representing smooth transitions.   
 
The late 1980s and early 1990s and 2007 onwards are obvious candidates for the impact on 
defaults of periods of lax lending standards.  After a default crisis, lending quality always 
improves, as lenders‟ experience of bad loans creates caution, and the shortage of funds 
available for lending induces credit rationing (witness the decline in loan-to-value and loan-
to-income ratios since mid-2007).  Improved methods of credit scoring and arrears 
management probably raised lending quality in the later 1990s and early 2000s. Table 2 sets 
out the priors used to check for loan quality and the other influences on the LQ function. 
                                                 
20
 The Mortgage Rescue Scheme was intended to help a small minority of vulnerable households and 
should reduce both arrears and possessions, and hence be part of the „loan quality‟ function. However, 
Homeowners‟ Mortgage Support, which became fully operational in April 2009, was intended to lower 
mortgage payments for up to two years for those with payment problems expected to be temporary.  It 
should lower possessions and raise arrears and therefore be part of the forbearance policy function. 
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4. Empirical results for the estimation of possessions and arrears  
 
4.1 An empirical joint model for mortgage possessions and arrears, with variable lending 
quality and policy shifts. 
 
Models are simultaneously estimated for total  possessions and two different arrears measures 
(greater than 6 months and greater than 12 months), together with two linear functions for the 
dummy proxies of loan quality, broadly conceived, and forbearance  policy changes.
21
 
Parsimonious versions of the estimated equations are presented below, with the variables 
defined in Table 3.  Equation estimates are given in Table 4a and 4b.  
 
Possessions and arrears are driven by three economic fundamentals: the debt service ratio; the 
proxy for the proportion of mortgages in negative equity, calibrated from an average debt to 
equity ratio; and the unemployment rate. Modelling the three equations as a system with 
common lending quality and policy shifts helps greatly in the identifying the unobservables. 
By sharp contrast with earlier UK literature, there is no significant effect on the rate of 
possessions from either measure of arrears.  This important finding is discussed further below. 
 
The selected possessions equation 
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As in equation (5), the dependent variable is the change in the log possessions rate. The speed 
of adjustment is given by the parameter, 4a , which multiplies the long-run solution for the 
log possessions rate. The coefficients on loan quality and policy indicators, a5 and a6 are 
normalized at one. The debt service ratio, dsrlog , is a lagged four-quarter moving average, 
as is negative equity, negeqlog , while the unemployment rate, urlog , has a lag of four 
quarters. In the dynamics, the change in the policy indicator has a unit coefficient, restricting 
the short-run and long-run effects of policy to be the same.  The change in the lagged 
possessions rate enters with a two quarter lag. The current and lagged changes in the negative 
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  The computations were performed in Hall, Cummins and Schnake‟s Time Series Processor (TSP 5) 
package, using TSP‟s SUR procedure to obtain seemingly unrelated regression estimates of a set of 
nonlinear equations (the maximum likelihood results were almost identical). 
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equity indicator reflect changed expectations of house prices influencing both borrowers and 
lenders. A seasonal dummy and two impulse dummies complete the specification.  
 
The quarterly speed of adjustment, estimated at 0.43, suggests the regressors have most of 
their effect within a year.
22
  The debt service ratio is highly significant with a robust t-ratio of 
18.  The estimate suggests that a 1 percent rise in the debt service ratio raises the possession 
rate by almost twice as much. The log proportion of those in negative equity is also highly 
significant with a t-ratio of 15.  A one percent rise in this proportion is estimated to increase 
the possessions rate by 0.7 of one percent.  The effect of the log unemployment rate is far less 
accurately estimated, with a point estimate of 0.2, but a standard error of 0.15, suggesting that 
a value of 0.4 would also have been statistically acceptable. Unemployment is important for 
arrears: given the regional evidence from Muellbauer and Cameron (1997) and micro-
evidence from Boheim and Taylor (2000), it was retained in the possessions equation.
23
 
 
The long-run effects
24
 on the possessions rate are shown in Figure 7 for the debt-service ratio, 
estimated proportion in negative equity and the unemployment rate. Figure 8 shows the long-
run impact of loan quality and forbearance policy, discussed further below. The figures 
suggest that in the first possessions crisis in 1989-93, the initial rise in possessions was driven 
mainly by the rise in the debt-service ratio, combined with lower loan quality, but later the 
rising incidence of negative equity emerged as an important driver.  The persistence of 
negative equity prevented a faster decline in possessions, despite lower interest rates and the 
forbearance policy introduced at the end of 1991.  In the second possessions crisis, the rise in 
possessions from its low level in 2004 again was caused by a growing debt-service ratio, and 
later the increasing incidence of negative equity, which rose sharply in 2008-9.   
 
Data on the voluntary possessions rate are available only for a shorter sample: this equation 
was estimated separately, but incorporating the estimated lending quality indicator from the 
three-equation system.  As expected, the policy shift measure proved insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 With two of the regressors entering as lagged four-quarter moving averages, however, the response 
to the underlying drivers is further delayed. 
23
 A specification of the loan quality function including a step-dummy for 1992 results in the 
unemployment rate coefficient being larger and more significant.  The negative coefficient on the 
dummy suggests that the earlier deterioration in loan quality was partially reversed in 1992, perhaps 
because of the switch in income support payments for mortgage interest direct to lenders. 
24
 This assumes the base scenario (see section 4.3) for interest rates, house prices, unemployment, 
income and average debt, for 2009-13. 
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The selected voluntary possessions equation 
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The dependent variable is the change in the log of the voluntary possessions rate; the long-run 
debt service and negative equity terms are four quarter moving averages. The speed of 
adjustment, 4v , is estimated at 0.24, lower than for total possessions. The long-run effects of 
the debt service ratio, negative equity and loan quality are larger than on the total possessions 
rate. Unemployment and the lagged arrears rate are not significant in this equation. Given the 
short sample and problems in measuring the voluntary possessions rate, these results need to 
be treated with caution. Nevertheless, they suggest that the voluntary component of 
possessions is particularly vulnerable to lower loan quality and to debt service problems.  
 
The selected arrears equations 
 
The two arrears equations have a similar structure; the three main drivers are the log debt 
service ratio, the log imputed proportion in negative equity and the log unemployment rate.  
 
Arrears > 12 months 
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Arrears > 6 months 
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The dependent variables are the changes in the log of arrears measures (greater than 6 months 
and greater than 12 months). In each equation, the long-run debt service and negative equity 
terms are lagged four quarter moving averages. The speed of adjustment for 12logarr is 
estimated at almost 50 percent per quarter and around 35 percent for 6logarr .  Without the 
22 
 
adjustment for the outflow into possessions, however, the estimated speeds would be rather 
lower. The estimate of the long-run effect of the debt service ratio, with t-ratios of 11 and 12, 
suggests that a 1 percent rise in the debt service ratio raises 12arr by about 1.6 percent and 
6arr by 1.5 percent. The log proportion of those in negative equity is highly significant, with 
t-ratios of 9 for 12arr and 7.5 for 6arr : a one percent rise is estimated to increase 12arr by 
0.6 of one percent and 6arr by 0.4 percent..  The estimate of the long-run effect of log 
unemployment rate is 0.8 for 12arr , and 1 for 6arr .25  
 
The long-run effect on the stocks of arrears of loan quality is measured by the parameters 
5b  
and 
5c  with the same-signed effect on arrears as on possessions. Forbearance policy has the 
opposite signed effect from that on possessions. Its incentive or demonstration effect is 
measured by the parameters b6 and b7 , expected to be negative since PS is negative when 
forbearance policy is in force. The formulation allows a lag in the incentive effect of policy, 
when  takes a value below 1, and the hypothesis that 0.5  is accepted and so imposed. 
For both arrears equations, the long-run effects of loan quality on stocks of arrears are more 
than double that on the flow into possessions. The incentive or demonstration effect of 
forbearance policy on arrears, however, is similar in proportionate terms to that on 
possessions, a little higher on 6arr  than 12arr .  This seems plausible, as those with lower 
levels of arrears can be expected to relax more than those already on the brink of possession. 
 
The correction factors for the bias in the arrears count when interest rates change (section 3.1) 
are strongly significant, with t-ratios above 4. Such an explicit correction has not been made 
in previous studies of UK arrears.  The measurement bias hypothesis implies a dynamic 
restriction imposed on each arrears equation, and its validity can be tested by adding 
unrestricted ∆dsr terms (at times t and t-1) to each arrears equation.  These terms prove 
insignificant on individual t-tests and by a likelihood ratio test on the three-equation system. 
 
Figures 9 and 10 plot the long-run contribution of loan quality and policy variables to the 6-
month arrears rate. As for possessions, the rise in arrears in 1989-93 was initially driven by 
                                                 
25
 Whitley et al. estimate the unemployment effect to be smaller at 0.7 for 6-month arrears, using the 
claimant count measure of unemployment, not the LFS measure. In contrast, they report a t-ratio of 
only 1.3 for the long-run coefficient of a measure of unwithdrawn equity on 6-month arrears, intended 
to capture a similar effect to negative equity. However, to compensate for the weak role of debt to 
equity, they estimate the long-run elasticity w.r.t. the debt service ratio to be around 3, almost double 
our estimate.  Cooper and Meen (2001) find long-run elasticities of around 3 for the debt-service ratio, 
the unemployment rate and for the debt-equity ratio.  This would make the arrears rate even more 
sensitive in the long-run to the interest rate and to unemployment than implied by our estimates. 
However, the estimated speed of adjustment is far lower at 0.08 with a standard error of 0.025, so that 
there are considerable margins of uncertainty around these estimates. 
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the rise in the debt service ratio and lower loan quality. The impact of negative equity, higher 
unemployment and forbearance policy came later.  The contributions of the debt service ratio 
and of loan quality were larger than for possessions, while that of negative equity was 
smaller. The rise in arrears in 2008-9 is explained mainly by previous rises in the debt service 
ratio, the increased incidence of negative equity, the effect of forbearance policy, and, in 
2009, by the rise in the unemployment rate. 
 
Details of the selected loan quality and forbearance policy functions are discussed next.  
 
The selected loan quality equation 
 
t t t
t t
t t 2 t 2
4
86 86 89 89 94 94
95 95 97 97 05 05
06 06 07 07 09 d2008q4
09 d2008q4 10 10 12 12
t
t t t
LQ l sdmm l sdmm l sdmm
l sdmm l sdmm l sdmm
l sdmm l a sdmm l a s
l b s l sdmm l sdmm
      (16) 
 
The formulation in equation (16) was selected from a general specification by eliminating 
terms which contradicted the priors set out in Table 2 or were insignificant.  The equation 
includes a post-sample step dummy for 2008Q4, lagged two and four periods, and smoothed 
dummies for 2010 and 2012. Parameter estimates are reported in Table 4b. (Assumptions on 
the parameters l09b, l10 and l12 for the forecast scenarios are discussed below.) The first sign 
of deteriorating lending quality in the latter 1980s was apparent in defaults in 1986-7, 
exacerbated in 1989, and peaking in 1990Q4. These are reflected in positive estimated values 
for l86 and l89, probably also capturing some decline in credit availability typically following 
lax standards.  By 1994-6, subsequent tighter standards lowered default levels, reflected in 
negative estimated values for l94 and l95. By 1997, the earlier tightening of rules on income 
support for mortgage interest (SMI) in 1995 had begun to raise arrears and possessions.  
Further small improvements in loan quality or, more likely, improved refinancing 
possibilities, seen in negative estimates of l05 and l06, lowered subsequent defaults from 
2005 and 2006.
26
 A pronounced deterioration in defaults from 2007Q3, reflects both earlier 
lax lending standards and evaporation of refinancing opportunities (parameter 07l a ). 
                                                 
26
 Refinancing opportunities also increased through sale and rent-back deals with the development of 
the buy-to-let market. Sale and rent-back involves the sale of an owner-occupied home to an investor, 
shifting the occupier to a rental contract. Concerns about lack of regulation and of misinformed selling 
led to an Office of Fair Trading Inquiry in 2008. The 2008 OFT report suggests that there may have 
been 50,000 sale and rent back deals up to mid-2008, and up to 60 percent related to households at risk 
of possession. A significant equity cushion is necessary for sale and rent-back to be feasible, so this 
claim may be exaggerated. If sale and rent-back was a permanent institutional change, both possessions 
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It is difficult to estimate the longer run consequences of large policy shifts that affect loan 
quality from this relatively short sample. A softening of the SMI rules announced in the 
second half of 2008 took effect from January 2009.  The point estimate (parameter 09l a ) 
suggests the beneficial effect on defaults could offset as much as two thirds of the damage 
attributable to lax loan standards and tighter credit.  This seems too large and too immediate 
an effect to attribute entirely to the introduction of more generous income support rules. It 
probably also reflects strenuous efforts by the government to improve mortgage credit 
availability.
27
 The estimate is based on only two observations; given the estimated standard 
error, the true effect could be smaller, which will become apparent with more data.
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An alternative formulation of the loan quality indicator, based on median loan-to-value ratios 
for first-time buyers (CML data), proved less successful in fitting the data. The estimates 
suggest a negative short-run affect (probably reflecting access to refinancing), but positive 
effects of loan-to-value ratios, expressed as four-quarter moving averages at lags of four or 
more quarters (probably reflecting more slowly evolving loan quality). The estimates of the 
key economic drivers on possessions and arrears are little affected by adopting the alternative 
specification of loan quality, however. 
 
The selected forbearance policy equation   
 
4
3 4
91 ( 91 97 ) 08 2008 4
09 2008 4 09 2008 4
t t tt
t t
PS p sd sdmm p sd q
p a sd q p b sd q
     (17) 
 
The estimated policy function represents the possessions-lowering and arrears-raising effect 
of increased forbearance practiced by lenders and the courts (parameter estimates in Table 
4b).  A sharp change in policy in December 1991 is represented by a step dummy from 
1992Q1.  In 1997-8, the earlier withdrawal of this forbearance and resumption of „normal‟ 
practice is confirmed by the data.  The restriction is imposed that this cancelled the earlier 
increase of forbearance. A step dummy for 2008Q4 represents newly reinforced forbearance: 
the point estimate of -0.25 compares with an estimate of -0.17, for the 1991 policy shift. Some 
of the shift in 2008 would have been only temporary in nature if the revised mortgage code of 
                                                                                                                                            
and arrears might be a little lower relative to economic fundamentals than in the early 1990s. Tighter 
regulation and lower credit availability, however, are likely to reduce the numbers of such deals. 
27
 This occurred through reversing the previous contraction of Northern Rock‟s loan book, and 
agreements of high mortgage lending targets with Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds TSB as a 
condition for allowing them to take part in the Asset Protection Scheme. 
28
 Data published by CML on February 11, 2010 suggest that indeed the effect is smaller, as the model 
forecasts for the last quarter of 2009 proved a little too optimistic both for arrears and possessions. 
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practice merely delayed some possessions actions. Experimentation with lags in the 2008Q4 
step dummy, suggest a partial reversal of the earlier forbearance by 2009Q3. There is 
considerable uncertainty around the size of this effect, however. The estimated net effect at 
2009Q3 of -0.16 is close to the estimated 1991 policy shift.  The last term in equation (17) 
allows different post-sample assumptions to be made for forecast scenarios, see below. 
 
All published possessions models for UK macro data have imposed a 1:1 long-run effect of 
the arrears rate on the possessions rate. Our point estimates of the long-run coefficient on 
6logarr are negative, though not significant.  We tested this restriction by imposing a long-
run coefficient of one, and selecting, from general specifications, parsimonious equations 
consistent with sign priors on the economic variables and the loan quality function. This gave 
a possessions model where the log arrears rate was the only long-run driver of possessions. 
The arrears rate was corrected for measurement bias in this model. The debt service ratio, 
negative equity, the unemployment rate and the loan quality index were all insignificant or 
appeared with the wrong sign.  The speed of adjustment of the possessions equation fell from 
over 0.4 to around 0.12. The fit of the resulting possessions equation was substantially worse, 
while estimates for the two arrears equations, the loan quality and policy functions were little 
changed.  A likelihood ratio test for the three equation system of the hypothesis that the long-
run coefficient on 6logarr  is one, rejects this with chi-squared at 35. 
 
Since it seems plausible that most possessions cases would first have been in arrears, the 
above rejection of the „one-for-one‟ relationship is paradoxical. Most arrears cases do not end 
in possession, however, which much reduces the paradox. The evidence of our preferred 
model further implies that possessions are less sensitive to unemployment (and loan quality) 
than arrears. Forcing a one-for-one effect of arrears on possessions would then require a 
counter-intuitive negative impact of unemployment (and loan quality) on possessions to offset 
a too strong effect coming through arrears. In our approach, these potential „wrong signs‟ are 
excluded by sign priors applied in selecting a parsimonious „one-for-one‟ model.   
 
4.2 Forecasts of mortgage possessions and arrears, 2009-2013 
 
Forecasts are given for 2009-2013 of total and voluntary mortgage possessions, arrears (≥6 
months) and arrears (≥12 months), based on different economic scenarios. These forecasts 
were generated using the model described in section 4.1. The different scenarios are outlined 
in Table 5 with assumptions for the exogenous variables: unemployment rates, interest rates 
(and hence debt service ratios), house prices (and hence debt to equity ratios), and per capita 
26 
 
real income and prices, with details on the economic assumptions in Annex 2. The varying 
scenarios illustrate possible risk factors in the outlook for arrears and possessions. 
 
Eight contrasting scenarios are given in Table 5. The first five are broadly based around 
November 2009 forecasts by Oxfordeconomics.com for underlying variables including 
interest rates, unemployment rates, inflation, house prices, disposable income, the mortgage 
stock and working age population.  Key features of the base scenario, Scenario 1 are 
unemployment peaking at 8.6 percent in 2010 then declining gently to 6.9 percent by the end 
of 2013, and interest rates remaining moderate, so that even by mid-2012 mortgage rates are 
only 100 basis points higher than in mid-2009, rising another 90 basis points to the end of 
2013.  In the base scenario, house prices dip a little in 2010, remain subdued, recovering in 
nominal terms to end 2009 levels only in mid-2012, and then rising gently.  Inflation is 
extremely subdued, under 0.5 percent per annum in 2010, drifting up to around 1 percent in 
2011, and under 2 percent in 2012 and a little over 2 percent in 2013. Real per capita income 
growth is moderate at around 2 percent per annum from the end of 2009 to the end of 2013. 
The mortgage stock grows a little below the growth rate of aggregate nominal personal 
disposable income.  
 
 In the base scenario and all others except scenario 1A, forbearance policy continues to the 
end of 2013.  In all scenarios except scenario 1B, modest improvements in loan quality are 
assumed beginning in 2010 and extended from 2012 by assuming that parameters  l10 and l12 
in equation (16) are both equal to -0.02.  This is intended to reflect the improved loan quality 
on loans made after mid-2007, and an assumed return to more normal lending conditions, 
albeit under tighter financial regulation under terms still to be worked out under national and 
international agreements.  
 
Thus, scenario 1A makes the base economic assumptions, but assumes that forbearance on 
possessions comes to an end in 2009Q4 by taking p09b=0.17 in equation (17), cancelling out 
the net contributions reflected in .p08 and p09a.  Scenario 1B takes the base economic 
scenario as given, leaves policy unchanged from 2009Q3, but makes a more negative 
assumption on loan quality, assuming l09b=0.1, see equation (16), cancelling most of the 
benefits of more generous income support policies.  Moreover, l10 and l12 are taken as zero, 
so that the further marginal improvements under the other scenarios do not occur.  Scenario 2 
is a higher growth version of the base scenario, in which unemployment peaks at 8.4 percent 
and falls to 6.4 percent at the end of 2013.  Income growth is a little faster and house prices do 
not fall in 2010, and start rising at first gently, but ultimately by over 4 percent in 2011, over 5 
percent in 2012 and over 6 percent in 2013.  Interest rates rise earlier in this scenario and from 
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the end of 2010 are around 70 basis points higher than in the base scenario.  The mortgage 
stock grows somewhat faster than in the base scenario, so that by the end of 2013 it is 6 
percent higher than in the base. Scenario 3 is a lower growth variant of the base scenario, with 
higher unemployment, lower growth but also even lower interest rates. 
 
These scenarios all make rather optimistic assumption that mortgage interest rates remain low 
for an extended period and that the unemployment rate will peak at moderate levels.  
Alternative scenarios with more volatile interest rates, unemployment and house prices were 
therefore considered. Scenario 4 assumes a more rapid fall in unemployment from a higher 
peak in 2011, an earlier recovery in house price growth and hence earlier rises in interest 
rates.  The mortgage stock assumption is the same as in the base scenario.  Scenario 5 is an 
optimistic variant of scenario 4 in which, after rising further initially, unemployment falls 
rapidly from a peak in 2011Q1, while interest rates remain remarkably subdued, rising only 
150 basis points from 2009Q2 to 2012 and remaining constant in 2013. House prices rise 
sharply, at over 6.5 percent per annum between the end of 2010 and 2013 and the mortgage 
stock rises more strongly than in the base scenario.  Scenario 6 takes a far more pessimistic 
case.  Unemployment peaks at 11.4 percent in 2011 and is down only to 8.5 percent at the end 
of 2013.  Interest rates rise rapidly in 2010, perhaps because of a sovereign debt crisis in the 
UK, and remain high to the end of 2013. House prices fall in nominal terms in 2010, remain 
constant in 2011, then recover gradually, reaching nominal levels of end-2009 only by the end 
of 2013.  The mortgage stock grows only in line with working age population and the price 
level in this scenario.  
 
Graphical forecasts of the logs of possessions, voluntary possessions, arrears (≥6 months) and 
arrears (≥12 months), for each of eight scenarios, for 2009Q4 to 2013Q4, are shown in Annex 
3. The underlying assumptions are traced out from 2000Q1 to 2013Q4 in the graphs beneath 
these figures. The forecasts of the numbers of properties taken into possession in the period, 
and of the numbers of household with loans in arrears (≥12 months and ≥6 months) are given 
in Table 6. Table 7 shows the corresponding forecasts for the estimated proportion of 
mortgages in negative equity, given assumptions on the ratio of average debt to average 
equity and forecasts of possessions. 
 
Despite these assumptions of the continuation of forbearance policy and mild improvements 
in loan quality, the forecast rate of possessions under scenario 1, rises to new heights by the 
end of 2013 after declining in 2010 and 2011.  This is partly due to the assumed rise in the 
mortgage interest rate, the assumed rise in the average mortgage size and the relatively weak 
recovery in house prices.  The same factors imply a more gradual upward drift in both 
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measures of mortgage arrears. The gradual fall in the unemployment rate, to which arrears are 
more sensitive, moderates the rise in the arrears rates. 
 
Scenario 1A assumes that forbearance on possessions ceases from 2009Q4 which, by the end 
of 2013, raises possessions flows by 19 percent, but lowers 6 month arrears by 46 percent and 
12 month arrears by 40 percent compared to scenario 1.  It is unlikely that such a policy shift 
would occur. The model suggests that forbearance policy is having a large effect on outcomes 
from 2009. 
 
Scenario 1B assumes that just over half the improvement seen in 2009Q2 and Q3 (due to 
improved income support for those with payment difficulties) is switched off from 2009Q4. 
In addition, small improvements in loan quality due to tighter lending criteria are now 
assumed away – or offset by lack of access to refinancing possibilities (parameters l10 and 
l12 in equation (16) are set to zero).  Not surprisingly, both possessions and arrears deteriorate 
relative to scenario 1 by the end of 2013, by 15 percent for possessions, 43 percent for 6 
month arrears, and 65 percent for 12 month arrears.
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The larger falls in unemployment and rises in house prices in scenario 2 are partially offset by 
higher interest rates and growth in mortgage debt.  The net effect is that possessions dip in 
2010 and 2011, as in scenario 1, but they rise again in 2012 and 2013, not quite to the 
2009Q1 peak and substantially below scenario 1.  Arrears rates peak at the end of 2010 for 6 
month arrears and the end of 2011 for 12 month arrears, but lower almost throughout than in 
scenario 1 (by 23 percent for 6 months and 11 percent for 12 months arrears by 2013). 
 
In scenario 3, higher unemployment, weaker house prices, but lower mortgage interest rates 
induce lower possessions rates than in scenario 1, but arrears rates are higher. By the end of 
2013, possessions are 6 percent lower, 6 month arrears 5 percent higher and 12 month 
+arrears 4 percent higher.  The fact that scenario 3 is only a little worse than scenario 1 is a 
symptom of the sensitivity to mortgage interest rates. 
 
In scenario 4, possessions decline a little in 2010 but then climb more sharply than in 
scenario 1, as interest rates rise more, and peak in early 2013. Arrears rates peak in 2012 
above those in scenario 1 given a higher unemployment peak, but then decline strongly under 
the impact of rapidly declining unemployment and rising house prices. 
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 The larger impact on arrears rates comes from the larger elasticity of arrears w.r.t. loan quality and 
from the reduction in the ratio of possessions to lagged arrears, which in equations (14) and (15) adjusts 
for the stock-flow relationship between possessions and arrears. 
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Scenario 5 considers a positive high volatility economic environment. Possessions decline in 
2010, climb a little in 2012 and 2013, but remain well below 2009 peaks, given strong house 
price growth despite some rise in interest rates and in average mortgage debt. Sharper rises in 
unemployment and the lagged response of arrears to the shift in forbearance policy, causes 
arrears to exceed 2009 levels in 2010 before falling substantially below 2009 levels thereafter, 
with sharply falling unemployment and rising house prices. 
 
Finally, scenario 6 assumes a negative high volatility economic environment.  In this 
„disaster‟ scenario, possessions in 2012 are almost four times higher than in 2009, and both 
types of arrears are almost three times above 2009 levels.  The combination of higher interest 
rates and weak house prices, is negative for possessions. Unemployment peaking at 11.4 
percent is a further factor lowering arrears. The combination of assumptions for the 
underlying variables is unlikely to happen in practice; this scenario is extremely pessimistic 
and included mainly to highlight the sensitivity of forecasts to the path of the economy.  
 
Turning to voluntary possessions, the estimated model is necessarily less reliable but suggests 
that voluntary possessions are even more sensitive in the long run than total possessions to 
negative equity, the debt service ratio and lending quality (especially the last two).  The 
forecasts of voluntary possessions in different scenarios confirm this finding.  In scenario 1, 
voluntary possessions are usually between one fifth and one quarter of total possessions from 
2010 to 2011 and a little over one quarter in 2012 to 2013, as interest rates rise. In scenario 
1B, the negative assumptions on loan quality raise the forecast voluntary possessions level to 
around half of the higher total of possessions by the end of 2013, compared with scenario 1. 
In the higher growth scenario 2 voluntary possessions are roughly one third of total 
possessions; in the lower growth scenario 3, they exceed a quarter of total possessions, given 
the greater sensitivity to higher interest rates and the higher rates assumed. 
 
Similar differences emerge in the higher volatility scenarios 4 to 6. For example, in the 
positive high volatility scenario 5, voluntary possessions are forecast to remain at between 
one third and one quarter of total possessions, given fairly benign assumptions about interest 
rates.  But in the „disaster‟ scenario 6, voluntary possessions rise at the end of 2013 to almost 
two thirds of total possessions as interest rates continue to rise, despite the weak housing 
market. 
 
Figure 11a to d shows the total and voluntary possessions numbers and the two arrears 
numbers under four of the scenarios.  These are the base scenario and its variant scenario 1a, 
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which switches off forbearance policy, and respectively the most positive and the most 
negative of the economic scenarios considered.  It is striking how the most negative scenario 
stands out.  It is driven by an assumed rise in interest rates which pushes down house prices 
and so raises negative equity and the unemployment rate.  In the other scenarios, interest rates 
are mainly determined by economic success or otherwise, so that weaker growth is 
compensated by lower interest rates, while stronger growth is partly offset by higher rates. 
This means that the effects on arrears and possessions are also moderate under these 
scenarios. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
Models for aggregate arrears and possessions rates have been developed in this paper, with 
sound economic foundations.  These incorporate policy shifts and proxies for loan quality that 
affect arrears and possessions rates in predictable directions at particular times.  Jointly 
estimating a three-equation system for the arrears and possessions rates, with cross equation 
restrictions, results in plausible magnitudes for the effects of policy shifts and lending quality. 
Parsimonious arrears and possessions models were tested successfully against more general 
specifications.  The long-run impact of four major drivers, house prices, interest rates, debt 
levels, income, is captured by just two coefficients:  on the debt equity ratio, transformed into 
a proxy for the fraction of mortgages with negative equity; and on the debt service ratio.  
Tests for interaction effects, e.g. whether the effect of unemployment was higher in years 
where negative equity was more prevalent, found no supporting evidence.  
 
The measurement distortion in the months-in-arrears measure was handled systematically, 
again with the help of parameter restrictions. The analysis of different forecast scenarios 
allows an assessment of risks for different views on the UK and global economies. There are 
inevitable uncertainties around the evaluation of temporary and permanent effects of recent 
policy shifts, however, and of the decline in lending quality in recent years.  With further data 
these estimates should become more accurate. A priority for future work is to endogenize UK 
house prices and the aggregate mortgage stock, checking for possible feedbacks from 
possessions, and perhaps arrears, onto house prices and the mortgage stock.
30
   
 
A notable conclusion of this research is to demonstrate the striking sensitivity of arrears and 
possessions to higher interest rates. If UK short-term interest rates were to increase mortgage 
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 Evidence from annual regional data in Cameron et al. (2006) is that a downside risk measure, based 
on recent negative investment returns, outperforms the aggregate possessions rate in explaining house 
prices. The direct feedback from possessions to house prices may not be so important, therefore. 
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rates would also increase, though probably by a smaller amount.
31
  The bad loans resulting 
from significantly higher mortgage rates could further impair the financial system, reducing 
economic growth. However, as noted above, mortgage possessions rates in 2009 in the UK 
were under one tenth of US rates so that the magnitude of the risks should not be overstated.  
 
To illustrate the magnitudes implied by this research, a 10 percent increase in the debt-service 
ratio, for example due to the mortgage interest rate rising from 4 percent to 4.4 percent, is 
estimated eventually to raise the possessions rate by around 19 percent, and the 6 month 
arrears rate, corrected for measurement bias, by 15 percent. This calculation holds the 
proportion of mortgages in negative equity and the unemployment rate fixed.  
 
At 2009Q3 house price and debt levels, a fall in house prices of 1.4 percent would raise the 
proportion of mortgages with negative equity from an estimated 8.5 percent to 9.35 percent, a 
10 percent proportionate increase. An increase of this magnitude in the rate of negative equity 
is estimated eventually to increase the possessions rate by 7 percent and the 6 month arrears 
rate by 3.5 percent.    A ten percent increase in the unemployment rate from 8 percent to 8.8 
percent is estimated to increase the possessions rate by 2 percent
32
 and the 6 month arrears 
rate by 10 percent.  
 
A second conclusion is that lenders‟ forbearance policy and the more generous government 
income support for those with mortgage payment difficulties at present appears to have had a 
notable effect in lowering possessions. As noted in the introduction, conditions in mortgage 
and housing markets in the UK have been far more benign in 2009 than feared in the autumn 
of 2008.  This has been achieved through policy interventions on an unprecedented scale, 
including the drastic reduction in base rates, and large-scale quantitative easing by the Bank 
of England, which brought down gilt yields and reduced rates on fixed rate mortgages. The 
bank rescues, and the direction given to expand mortgage lending, not only to Northern Rock 
(now wholly owned by the public sector), but also to Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds-
TSB as a condition of rescue,  have compensated significantly for the evaporation of lending 
from other sources, especially those financed by securitisation. In addition, there has been a 
Stamp Duty holiday, and a raft of further support measures already discussed. The 
sustainability of these relatively benign conditions is questionable, however, given the 
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 In late 2009 the spread between mortgage rates on new loans and base rate was close to 350 basis 
points, with base rates at 0.5%.  It seems likely that the spread would narrow with base rates at 1.5 or 2 
%.  Also with slightly higher base rates and hence higher deposit rates, retail saving flows into banks 
are likely to improve, perhaps easing credit constraints on lending. 
32
 This estimate is less accurate than the others and the figure could well be as high as 4 percent. 
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funding gap between retail deposits in UK banks and their loan book
33
, the time-table of 
withdrawal of the Special Liquidity Scheme and the Credit Guarantee Scheme, and concerns 
over the UK‟s sovereign debt. 
 
Two UK government objectives are to improve housing affordability and to restore financial 
stability. Housing has become unaffordable for many younger people, perpetuating the 
inequality from the redistribution of housing wealth of the late 1990s to 2007, from potential 
first-time buyers to older and wealthier households. However, substantial falls in house 
prices, triggered by the removal of income support, higher interest rates and potentially by 
supply and demand side reforms
34
, could increase negative equity and exacerbate the problem 
of bad banking loans. It would, however, be a mistake to take the risk of substantial falls in 
house prices as an excuse for not expanding residential land supply. For if reforms of the 
planning system and of incentives for local governments to expand the supply of residential 
building land were to increase the rate of future building, DCLG‟s housing affordability 
model and research done for the Barker review suggests that the effects on house prices 
would be felt only gradually. A further advantage in the short-run would be employment 
gains in the building industry at a time when the public sector will be shedding jobs. In the 
long-run, a more sustainable level of house prices relative to the financial capabilities of 
households should reduce the risk of new crises. 
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Table 1:  A typology of UK empirical studies on mortgage arrears and repossessions    
Study Dependent Variable  
& Sample 
Equity Measures Ability To Pay/Cash Flow 
Measures 
Lending quality/ 
Policy  
Methodology  
Selected Dissagregated Studies 
Muellbauer 
and Cameron 
(1997)  
Regional possessions relative to 
mortgage stocks 
 
Regional possession court orders; 
constructed  regional mortgage 
stocks; 1987-96 (annual) 
Debt/equity  Debt service ratio, change in 
unemployment rate, lagged 
business de-registration rate 
Lending quality 
proxy based on 
market share of 
centralized mortgage 
lenders, policy 
dummies 
Pool across 8 English 
regions and Wales; fixed 
effects panel regression 
Cooper and 
Meen (2001) 
Unscaled regional possessions 
Regional possession court orders; 
1990-99 (annual) 
Debt/equity for 
some regions 
Debt service ratio, change in 
unemployment rate, change in 
business de-registration rate 
Shift and other 
dummies 
Pool across 8 English 
regions and Wales, using 
regional shift dummies; 
stacked OLS 
Lambrecht, 
Perraudin and 
Satchell 
(1997) (2003) 
 
Average time to default 
Times to forced possession 
and times to voluntary possession 
5,272 defaults, from an insurance 
co. database of claims for 
compensation from a UK building 
society; 1987-9 
No treatment of 
current equity 
 
Borrower characteristics: 
initial salary; initial marital 
status.  Interest rate at which the 
mortgage was 
originally granted. 
Initial loan-to-value 
ratio 
Hazard model, using 
panel data 
Boheim and 
Taylor (2000)  
Incidence of arrears 
Incidence of eviction 
BHPS;  1991-97 
No treatment of 
current equity or 
debt. Loan-to-value 
ratios are initial 
values only. 
Borrower characteristics: 
Rich set of household 
characteristics; tenure; 
employment; income. Regional 
unemployment; interest rate. 
Initial size of 
mortgage 
and initial house 
value 
 
Pooled time series-cross 
sectional model, across 
all tenures 
Gathergood 
(2009) 
Repayment difficulties 
BHPS; 1992-2001 
No treatment of 
current equity or 
debt. Loan-to-value 
ratios are initial 
values only. 
Borrower characteristics: 
marital status, family size,  
employment, income etc.. 
Proxies for risk: health, 
employment & separation 
First-time buyer 
status; initial loan to 
value and loan to 
income ratios 
 
Random effects probit 
model, pooling 
household-observations 
over a 6 year period 
Burrows 
(1998) 
Mortgage arrears 
SEH; 1993-94 
Year of house 
purchase; loan-to-
value dummy. 
 
Borrower characteristics: rich 
set of household characteristics 
Lender characteristics:  region, 
mortgage type, lender type. 
First-time buyer 
status 
 
Logit model 
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Study Dependent Variable  
& Sample 
Equity Measures Ability To Pay/Cash Flow 
Measures 
Lending quality/ 
Policy  
Methodology  
Selected Macro-Based Studies 
Breedon and 
Joyce (1992)  
Arrears and possessions 
1971-91 
Level of unused 
housing equity  
 
 Unemployment rate, debt-
service ratio 
- Three-equation model of 
house prices, arrears and 
repossessions 
Brookes, 
Dicks and 
Pradhan 
(1994)  
 
 Mortgage arrears rate 6m+ and 
possessions as ratio of total 
mortgages outstanding 
Quarterly interpolation of data 
from CML; 1970Q2 to 1990Q4  
Unwithdrawn 
equity: net personal 
sector housing 
wealth /no. of 
mortgages.o 
Interest rates, inflation 
(instrument), debt service ratio 
using PDI, inflow to 
unemployment, divorce rate  
Loan-to-value ratio 
for first-time buyers 
in arrears but not 
possessions equation 
Engle-Granger two step 
method 
Allen and 
Milne (1994) 
Mortgage arrears rate 6m+ and 
possessions/arrears 
Half yearly data from CML, 
interpolated before 1980. 
arrears: 70H1-91H2 
possessions:1974H1-1991H2 
No equity treatment 
in arrears, but 
debt/equity drives 
possessions/arrears 
Arrears equation: debt service 
ratio, rates of change of house 
price/income and of  
employment 
 
- OLS   
Cooper and 
Meen (2001) 
Possessions and arrears data 
Quarterly interpolation of bi-
annual CML data 
1985-2000 
Debt/gross housing 
equity ratio in both 
arrears and 
possessions 
Debt service ratio for first-time 
buyers, LFS unemployment rate 
and income inequality in arrears 
equation 
Impulse dummies Equilibrium-correction 
model with OLS 
Whitley et al. 
(2004) 
Aggregate UK household arrears: 
proportion of mortgage loans in 
arrears of six months or more 
Quarterly interpolation of bi-
annual CML data 
1985-2000 
Undrawn equity: 
gross housing 
wealth minus 
mortgage debt as a 
percentage of 
housing wealth.  
Debt service ratio: building 
societies‟ average mortgage 
interest rate  x  mortgage 
debt/PDI; unemployment rate 
(claimant count); lagged credit 
card arrears 
Loan-to-value ratio 
for first-time buyers 
(borrower quality) 
Tested proportion of 
households with 
MPPI.  
Error-correction 
representation using OLS 
regression 
Figueira et al. 
(2005) 
Arrears in excess of 3 months 
relative to total mortgages 
Monthly data for England and 
Wales, May 1993 to April 2001. 
Data on owner-occupier 
borrowers from a consortium of 
mortgage lenders (36 per cent of 
the total UK mortgage book) 
Level of 
unwithdrawn 
equity:  (average 
house price minus 
average 
mortgage)/average 
mortgage 
Unemployment rate; 
lenders‟ mortgage interest rates; 
real personal disposable income 
Debt–service ratio: 
mortgage interest payments to 
real  (sic.) PDI 
 
Loan to income ratio 
for first-time buyers  
1. Test for structural 
breaks.  2. Dummy 
for effect of changes 
to social security 
entitlement and 
increases in MPPI 
Johansen methodology, 
VAR with 2 lags on 
monthly data. Error 
correction model is 
estimated for long-run 
and short-run dynamics 
in mortgage arrears. 
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Table 2:  Priors on lending standards and policy shifts 
Date Shift Arrears Impact Possessions Impact 
1986-1989 
 
Bad lending, reduced 
credit access at end.  
Arrears up 
 
Possessions up 
End 1991 Policy shift to reduce 
possessions 
Arrears up 
 
Possessions down 
1994/5 Better lending 
quality 
Arrears down  Possessions up 
1997 Policy reversal (back 
to normal) and SMI  
lending quality 
Arrears ? Possessions up 
1999-2006 Good lending quality 
and/or easy credit 
access 
Arrears down 
 
Possessions down 
2007-2009 Bad lending, reduced 
access to credit 
Arrears up 
 
Possessions up 
2008q4 Policy shift to reduce 
possessions 
Arrears up 
 
Possessions down 
2008-9 Income support 
made more generous 
Arrears down Possessions down 
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Table 3:  Definitions of variables used in the regressions   
Symbol Definition Means Source  
tposslog  Log of the ratio of possessions to number of mortgages outstanding  -7.361 CML 
tvposslog  Log of the ratio of voluntary possessions to number of mortgages 
outstanding  -9.209 
CML 
tarr6log  Log of the ratio of  arrears (greater than or equal to months ) to number 
of mortgages outstanding -4.690 
CML 
tarr12log
 Log of the ratio of  arrears (greater than or equal to 12 months ) to 
number of mortgages outstanding -5.942 
CML 
turlog   Unemployment rate (ILO measure) 1.993 ONS 
tdsrlog   Cost of loan to income, measured as:  
(( /100)( ( 1)) / ( )arbm avmort avpdi   
arbm=average mortgage interest rate, rbm
1
, adjusted for tax before 
2000; avmort=amwt/mortno; amwt=mortgage lending, stock, personal 
sector (£mn), from Financial Statistics; mortno=mortgages outstanding 
from CML; avpdi=4 x quarterly personal disposable income
2
, current 
prices (£mn)/popw; popw=population of working age, 15 to 59 for 
women, 15 to 64 for men („000s), quarterly interpolation. -7.164 
mortno: CML 
popw:  ONS 
amwt: ONS 
rbm: ONS 
pdi: ONS 
tnegeqlog   Log of the debt equity ratio, measured to proxy average mortgage to 
house prices. Implied proportion of negative equity (normalised) 
 (see equation (4), section 2.1): 
0
([1/ (1 exp(- *  (log( / ) - ))] )
t
negeq avdebt equity   
Then adjust negeq by subtracting the cumulated number of possessions 
cases over the previous 2 years, scaled by no. of mortgages outstanding.  
(average debt)/( (average equity)=avmort(-1)/(ph);  
ph=2nd-hand mix-adjusted house prices
3
 (2002Q1=100), normalized. 
λ=7, λ0  = - 0.001*(t - 40) + 0.04. -3.150 
ph: ONS 
tsd2008q4         step dummy =1 from 2008Q4, and 0 otherwise  - Constructed 
tsdmmxx  Double moving average of step dummies, with a smooth increasing 
transition from zero to one over 8 quarters, from zero in the last quarter 
of year xx-1, to one in the last quarter of year xx+1 
- Constructed 
td84q3  Impulse dummy for 1984Q3 for an outlier in 12month+arrears. - Constructed 
td89q3  Impulse dummy for 1989Q3 for an outlier in possessions. - Constructed 
td2003q4  Impulse dummy for 2003Q4 for an outlier in possessions. - Constructed 
Notes: The sample is the longest available for both arrears and repossessions, 1983Q2 to 2009Q3. 
Interpolated quarterly CML data are used before 1999, see section 3.2.1. 
1. Mortgage rate: from 2007Q1 FSA MLAR, Table 1.22 - Residential loans to individuals: Interest rate 
analysis. Overall weighted average interest rate on balances outstanding, all loans. From 2000 to 2006, 
linked to average of mortgage rate on balances outstanding for banks and building societies, previously 
reported in Financial Statistics. Before 2000, linked to average mortgage rate on balances outstanding 
for building societies, previously reported in Financial Statistics, code AJNL. 
2. Nominal household disposable income = real household disposable income x consumer expenditure 
deflator, where the latter = current price measure of consumer expenditure/chained volume index of 
consumer expenditure from Consumer Trends, both seasonally adjusted. Real household disposable 
income SA Table 38 from UK Economic accounts, code NRJR. 
3. Mix-adjusted index for UK for old dwellings from DCLG website Table 594. 
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Table 4a:  Estimation results for arrears and possessions equations, 1983Q2-2009Q3   
Variable Symbol 
Possessions 
equation: 
∆log poss 
Robust std. 
errors 
Symbol 
Arrears 
equation: 
∆log ass12 
Robust 
std. 
errors 
Symbol 
Arrears 
equation: 
∆log arr6 
Robust 
std. 
errors 
Constant a0 7.60** 0.96 b0 3.39** 1.35 c0 3.06** 1.11 
log dsrma(-1) a1 1.86** 0.10 b1 1.59** 0.15 c1 1.47** 0.12 
log negeqma(-1) a2 0.718** 0.046       
log negeqma(-2)    b2 0.598** 0.065 c2 0.397** 0.053 
log ur(-4) a3 0.199 0.146    c3 0.976** 0.267 
log ur(-5)    b3 0.782* 0.331    
Speed of adjustment a4 0.434** 0.047 b4 0.474** 0.038 c4 0.345** 0.034 
LQ (loan quality) a5 1 - b5 2.90** 0.65 c5 2.35** 0.54 
PS (policy shift) a6 -1 - b6 0.815* 0.435 c6 
1.14** 
 
0.42 
Correction factor - - - θ12 -0.303** 0.074 θ6 
-0.239** 
 
0.052 
 
∆log negeq a7 0.172** 0.046 b7 0.0798* 0.0323 c7 
0.0508* 
 
0.0218 
 
∆log negeq (-1) a8 0.158** 0.047 b8 0.0947** 0.0323 c8 0.0632** 0.0223 
∆4log ur a9 0 - b9 0.313** 0.113 c9 0.246** 0.069 
∆log POSS(-2) a10 0.323** 0.056       
dynamic shift 
adjustment 
   b10 0.322** 0.096 c10 0.493** 0.078 
d89q3 a11 0.0709** 0.0165 - - - - - - 
d2003q4(-1) a12 -0.182** 0.064 - - - - - - 
q1 a13 -0.159* 0.063 - - - - - - 
d84q3 - - - - - - c11 0.133** 0.028 
Diagnostics 
Eq. standard error  0.062   0.043   0.028  
R squared  0.990   0.997   0.998  
LM Het test P-val  0.050   0.343   0.471  
Durbin-Watson  1.55   1.65   2.09  
Notes:  
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1. Estimates are reported to three significant figures. See the equations that generated these results in section 4.1; variables are defined in Table 3. 
2. ** indicates significant at the 1 percent level; * indicates significant at the 5 percent level. 
3. The policy function enters as (kappa*PS+(1-kappa)*PS(-1)), with kappa fixed at 0.5.  
4. The dynamic shift adjustment is for the 12-month and 6-month arrears, respectively,  
1 12 1
1 99 * log 12    log
t t t
sd arr dsr  and 
1 6 1
1 99 * log 6    log
t t t
sd arr dsr   
where sd99 is a step dummy beginning in 1999 when data frequency shifted to quarterly.  
 
  
Table 4b:  Estimation results for policy and lending quality equations, 1983q2-2009q3  
Variable Symbol Estimate  
Robust 
std. errors    
 Robust 
t-statistic 
Policy function 
(sd91(-4) - 
sdmm97) p91       -0.173** 0.047 -3.66 
sd2008q4 p08          -0.252** 0.057 -4.42 
sd2008q4(-3) p09      0.093 0.061 1.52 
Lending quality function 
sdmm86 l86       0.053* 0.026 2.04 
sdmm89 l89       0.324** 0.078 4.14 
sdmm94 l94       -0.095** 0.036 -2.66 
sdmm95 l95       -0.074 0.040 -1.86 
sdmm97 l97       0.080* 0.034 2.37 
sdmm05 l05      -0.031 0.033 -0.94 
sdmm06 l06      -0.070 0.042 -1.66 
sdmm07(-2) l07a     0.274** 0.083 3.32 
sd2008q4(-2) l09a      -0.190** 0.058 -3.28 
Notes:  
1. Estimates are reported to three significant figures. See the equations that generated these results in section 4.1; variables are defined in Table 3. 
2. ** indicates significant at the 1 percent level; * indicates significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 5:  Scenarios for mortgages arrears and possessions forecasts 2009q1-2013q4 
 
EXOGENOUS  
VARIABLE 
 
 
SCENARIO 1  
BASE 
 
SCENARIO  
1A  BASE   
policy 
intervention 
effects  
switched off 
 
SCENARIO 
 1B BASE   
sensitivity test 
around the 
lending quality 
variable 
 
SCENARIO 2  
POSITIVE 
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
NEGATIVE 
 
SCENARIO 4 
HIGHER 
VOLATILITY 
 
 
SCENARIO 5 
POSITIVE 
HIGHER 
VOLATILITY 
 
 
 
SCENARIO 6 
NEGATIVE 
HIGHER 
VOLATILITY 
 
 
Policy p09b=0 p09b=0.17 p09b=0 p09b=0 p09b=0 p09b=0 p09b=0 p09b=0 
Lending Quality l09a=0 
l10 =-0.02 
l12 =-0.02 
l09a=0 
l10 =-0.02 
l12 =-0.02 
l09a=0.1 
l10=0   
l12=0 
l09a=0 
l10 =-0.02 
l12 =-0.02 
l09a=0 
l10 =-0.02 
l12 =-0.02 
l09a=0 
l10 =-0.02 
l12 =-0.02 
l09a =-0.02 
L112 =-0.02 
l09a=0 
l10 =-0.02 
l12 =-0.02 
Unemployment  
Rate  
UP 
UP=UPBASE  UP=UPBASE  UP=UPHG UP=UPHG UP=UPLG   UP= 
UPBASEALT   
UP=UPXPOS   UP=UPXNEG   
House Price 
PH 
PH=PHBASE  PH=PHBASE  PH=PHBASE  PH=PHHG PH=PHLG   PH= 
PHBASEALT   
PH=PHXPOS   PH=PHXNEG   
Real Income 
PEDY 
PEDY= 
PEDBASE 
PEDY= 
PEDBASE 
PEDY= 
PEDBASE 
PEDY=PEDHG PEDY=PEDLG PEDY= 
PEDYBASEALT 
PEDY= 
PEDYXPOS 
PEDY= 
PEDYXNEG 
Price Level 
PC 
PC=PCBASE PC=PCBASE PC=PCBASE PC=PCHG PC=PCLG   PC=PCALT PC=PCALT PC=PCALT 
Mortgage Rate 
ARBM  
ARBM= 
ARBMBASE 
ARBM= 
ARBMBASE 
ARBM= 
ARBMBASE 
ARBM= 
ARBMHG 
ARBM= 
ARBMLG 
ARBM= 
ARBMBASEALT 
ARBM= 
ARBMXPOS 
ARBM= 
ARBMXNEG 
Population 
POPW 
POPWR= 
POPWRBASE 
POPWR= 
POPWRBASE 
POPWR= 
POPWRBASE 
POPWR= 
POPWRBASE 
POPWR= 
POPWRBASE 
POPWR= 
POPWRALT 
POPWR= 
POPWRALT 
POPWR= 
POPWRALT 
No. of Mortgages 
MORTNOINT 
MORTNO= 
MORTNOBASE  
MORTNO= 
MORTNOBASE 
MORTNO= 
MORTNOBASE 
MORTNO= 
MORTNOBAS
E 
MORTNO= 
MORTNOBASE 
MORTNO= 
MORTNOALT 
MORTNO= 
MORTNOALT 
MORTNO= 
MORTNOALT 
Mortage  
Lending Stock  
AMWT 
AMWT= 
AMWTBASE 
AMWT= 
AMWTBASE 
AMWT= 
AMWTBASE 
AMWT= 
AMWTHG 
AMWT= 
AMWTLG 
AMWT= 
AMWTALT 
AMWT= 
AMWTALT 
AMWT= 
AMWTALT 
Notes: The actual values of the assumed variables for 2009q4-2013q4, e.g. UPBASE, are given in Annex 2. The different policy and lending quality 
assumptions are explained in Section 4.2. 
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Table 6:  Forecast results 2009q4-2013q4  
SCENARIO 1 
Forecast quarter 
Properties taken into 
possession in 
period/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥12 months/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥6 months/no. 
2009q1 12700 50600 141400 
2009q2 11400 60100 154900 
2009q3 11700 61100 154400 
2009q4 9843 61612 151210 
2010q1 10171 61134 150421 
2010q2 9076 62041 154343 
2010q3 8944 63759 160628 
2010q4 8478 64346 162999 
2011q1 9225 64377 164139 
2011q2 9014 64709 165761 
2011q3 9477 65635 168873 
2011q4 9645 66356 171036 
2012q1 11056 67035 173423 
2012q2 11398 68828 177519 
2012q3 12365 69663 179981 
2012q4 12842 71119 183635 
2013q1 14640 71467 185942 
2013q2 14729 71131 186425 
2013q3 15480 71392 188352 
2013q4 15549 71702 189992 
 
SCENARIO 2 
Forecast quarter 
Properties taken into 
possession in 
period/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥12 months/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥6 months/no. 
2009q1 12700 50600 141400 
2009q2 11400 60100 154900 
2009q3 11700 61100 154400 
2009q4 9843 61650 151283 
2010q1 10052 59832 147951 
2010q2 8891 59766 150444 
2010q3 8737 60955 156300 
2010q4 8300 60175 156980 
2011q1 9188 61066 161434 
2011q2 9123 62234 166333 
2011q3 9709 63256 171480 
2011q4 9856 63935 175472 
2012q1 11022 63197 176865 
2012q2 10929 62515 177558 
2012q3 11312 61084 176484 
2012q4 11202 60685 177195 
2013q1 12183 59104 175687 
2013q2 11738 57658 173598 
2013q3 11904 56552 172070 
2013q4 11573 55256 169411 
 
SCENARIO 6 
Forecast quarter 
Properties taken into 
possession in 
period/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥12 months/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥6 months/no. 
2009q1 12700 50600 141400 
2009q2 11400 60100 154900 
2009q3 11700 61100 154400 
2009q4 9847 62745 153375 
2010q1 10512 61576 151354 
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2010q2 10385 67596 164427 
2010q3 12044 78314 186219 
2010q4 14140 88686 203941 
2011q1 19456 103761 230903 
2011q2 23885 120422 262737 
2011q3 30372 138457 300661 
2011q4 35134 156115 341472 
2012q1 42840 168437 375412 
2012q2 43761 177746 402844 
2012q3 44879 181265 420551 
2012q4 43041 182622 433208 
2013q1 44845 180250 440029 
2013q2 41313 176672 442059 
2013q3 40017 170814 437238 
2013q4 37324 164811 429003 
Notes: Results for the other scenarios are contained in Annex 4.
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Table 7:  Forecast negative equity and debt to equity ratio 2009q1-2013q4    
Forecast 
quarter 
Negative 
Equity 
 
Debt equity 
ratio 
Negative 
Equity 
 
Debt 
equity 
ratio 
Negative 
Equity 
 
Debt 
equity 
ratio 
Negative 
Equity 
 
Debt 
equity 
ratio 
Negative 
Equity 
 
Debt 
equity 
ratio 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario5 Scenario 6 
1995q4 0.155 0.780 0.155 0.780 0.155 0.780 0.155 0.780 0.155 0.780 
2008q1 0.026 0.627 0.026 0.627 0.026 0.627 0.026 0.627 0.026 0.627 
2008q2 0.030 0.642 0.030 0.642 0.030 0.642 0.030 0.642 0.030 0.642 
2008q3 0.039 0.667 0.039 0.667 0.039 0.667 0.039 0.667 0.039 0.667 
2008q4 0.062 0.713 0.062 0.713 0.062 0.713 0.062 0.713 0.062 0.713 
2009q1 0.090 0.753 0.090 0.753 0.090 0.753 0.090 0.753 0.090 0.753 
2009q2 0.095 0.760 0.095 0.760 0.095 0.760 0.095 0.760 0.095 0.760 
2009q3 0.079 0.741 0.079 0.741 0.079 0.741 0.079 0.741 0.079 0.741 
Forecasts 
2009q4 0.074 0.736 0.074 0.736 0.074 0.736 0.074 0.736 0.074 0.736 
2010q1 0.079 0.744 0.074 0.737 0.079 0.744 0.074 0.738 0.092 0.760 
2010q2 0.084 0.751 0.075 0.739 0.084 0.752 0.067 0.728 0.113 0.785 
2010q3 0.085 0.753 0.071 0.734 0.087 0.756 0.062 0.720 0.140 0.812 
2010q4 0.086 0.755 0.068 0.730 0.088 0.757 0.057 0.713 0.143 0.816 
2011q1 0.088 0.758 0.065 0.726 0.088 0.759 0.053 0.706 0.146 0.820 
2011q2 0.089 0.760 0.063 0.723 0.089 0.760 0.050 0.701 0.149 0.824 
2011q3 0.091 0.763 0.061 0.720 0.090 0.762 0.048 0.697 0.152 0.829 
2011q4 0.093 0.766 0.059 0.717 0.091 0.764 0.047 0.694 0.154 0.833 
2012q1 0.095 0.768 0.057 0.714 0.093 0.766 0.045 0.692 0.156 0.837 
2012q2 0.095 0.770 0.055 0.711 0.094 0.768 0.045 0.690 0.145 0.831 
2012q3 0.095 0.771 0.052 0.709 0.093 0.769 0.044 0.691 0.135 0.825 
2012q4 0.094 0.770 0.050 0.705 0.093 0.769 0.044 0.691 0.125 0.819 
2013q1 0.092 0.769 0.048 0.702 0.093 0.770 0.045 0.693 0.116 0.814 
2013q2 0.089 0.768 0.046 0.699 0.093 0.771 0.045 0.695 0.107 0.808 
2013q3 0.086 0.765 0.044 0.696 0.092 0.772 0.046 0.697 0.100 0.803 
2013q4 0.084 0.763 0.042 0.693 0.092 0.773 0.047 0.700 0.093 0.798 
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Figure 1: Aggregate possessions rates: total, voluntary and Buy-to-Let (percentage  
of mortgages outstanding)  
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Source: CML; our interpolations to quarterly CML data are used before 1999. 
 
Figure 2: Arrears rates by months in arrears and ratio of 6 months in arrears to 5 
percent in arrears 
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Ratio: >6 months in arrears/ >5 % in arrears  
 
Source: CML; our interpolations to quarterly CML data are used before 1999. 
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Figure 3: Ministry of Justice data on possessions: court orders and claims,  
expressed as a rate using the count of CML mortgages outstanding 
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Source: Ministry of Justice (MoJ )quarterly date on court orders and actions. CML; interpolations to 
quarterly CML data are used before 1999, see section 3.2.1. 
Note: The MoJ court figures cover second charge lenders as well as first charge lenders, whereas the 
CML figures cover only first charge lenders, and therefore the proportions may seem slightly inflated 
(see Annex 1).  
 
Figure 4: The three key drivers: unemployment, the interest rate and debt equity 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
ratio
unemployment rate 
debt service ratio 
debt equity ratio 
 
Source: See Table 3 for sources of data and definitions.
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Figure 5:  The impact of an increase in the average debt equity ratio on the  
  proportion of mortgages in negative equity 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors‟ own calculations. 
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Figure 6:  Average debt equity ratio and the implied proportion of mortgages in  
  negative equity  
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 Source: See definitions in Table 3. 
 
 
Figure 7:  Estimated long-run contributions of key explanatory variables to the log  
possessions rate. 
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Note 1: Variables are level-adjusted for visual purposes. Scenario 1 is assumed for 2009q4 to 2013q4. 
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Figure 8:  Estimated long-run contribution of lending standards and policy shift  
proxies to the log possessions rate. 
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Note 1: Variables are level-adjusted for visual purposes. Scenario 1 is assumed for 2009q4 to 2013q4. 
 
Figure 9:  Estimated long-run contributions of key explanatory variables to the log  
6 month arrears rate. 
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Note 1: Variables are level-adjusted for visual purposes. Scenario 1 is assumed for 2009q4 to 2013q4. 
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Figure 10:  Estimated long-run contribution of lending standards and policy shift  
proxies to the log  6 month arrears rate. 
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Note 1: Variables are level-adjusted for visual purposes. Scenario 1 is assumed for 2009q4 to 2013q4. 
 
Figure 11: Forecast aggregate possessions and arrears numbers, under four scenarios. 
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Note:  Forecasts for the other scenarios will lie between the extremely pessimistic scenario 6 and the 
optimistic scenario 5, but closer to the latter.  For details of these forecasts, see Annexes 3 and 4.   
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ANNEX 1:  Availability and Quality of Mortgage Possessions and Arrears Data 
 
A1.  Publicly available data on mortgage possessions and arrears  
 
The available data on different measures of mortgage arrears and possessions (including 
voluntary and Buy-to-Let possessions) are summarised in Table A1
35
 for the three main 
providers: Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML), Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Financial 
Services Authority (FSA).  
 
To summarize, basic mortgage arrears (a count of mortgages classified by number of months 
in arrears) and possessions data from CML begin effectively in 1970, move from annual 
reporting to biannual reporting in 1981 or 1982, and to quarterly reporting in 2008.
36
  The 
1970s data are of limited interest, since credit market liberalization began only in 1980.  From 
1994, the CML arrears data are additionally available expressed as a count of mortgages 
classified by percentage of the loan outstanding.  The percentage data are a preferable 
measure, as the “number of months” measure is distorted by changes in the mortgage interest 
rate, tending to rise as the interest rate falls, see section 3.2.  Buy-to-Let arrears information 
becomes available from 1998.  The CML data on aggregate possessions include only first 
charge loan data reported by CML members. The CML data on Buy-to-Let possessions begin 
in 2005h2; and CML estimates of „voluntary‟ possessions begin in 1994.  CML data on Buy-
to-let possessions rates as a proportion of Buy-to-Let first charge mortgages show a broadly 
similar rise to those for non-Buy-to-Let mortgages, except for a sharper rise in 2008Q4, when 
the non- Buy-to-Let possessions rate actually fell by a small amount, presumably because of 
government policy interventions and a more lenient attitude by lenders, for example via the 
Mortgage Pre-action Protocol. CML data on voluntary possessions suggests that as a 
proportion of total possessions, voluntary possessions fell between the aftermath of the 1990s 
crisis and 2006, but have been rising strongly, though still far below the previous peak of 
close to 45 percent of all possessions.  This suggests that data from county court orders for 
mortgage possessions could be understating the rise in the overall rate at which home owners 
are losing their homes. 
 
The FSA data on arrears begin only in 2007Q1. They are classified by counts of mortgages by 
percentage of the loan outstanding and by the balances outstanding in each category. Since 
the FSA figures on arrears relate to the number of loan accounts that are in arrears, and not 
the number of mortgages (which is the basis for CML figures), the former will be 
significantly higher, see section A2. The FSA also provide other information, including the 
flow of new arrears cases. The FSA data on possessions include data from all regulated 
lenders, including second charge possessions, and so tend to be higher than CML possessions 
data, at least for non- Buy-to-Let mortgages, see section A2.  
 
                                                 
35
 Table A1 increases the relevant information relative to the Ministry of Justice table (MoJ, Jan 2009). 
The MoJ court actions data are national statistics and the FSA MLAR data are official statistics. 
'National Statistics' are a subset of official statistics which have been certified by the UK Statistics 
Authority as compliant with its Code of Practice for Official Statistics. The Statistics and Registration 
Service Act 2007 defines 'official statistics' as all those statistical outputs produced by the UK Statistics 
Authority's executive office (the Office for National Statistics), by central Government departments 
and agencies, by the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and by other 
Crown bodies. 
36
 Table A1 shows that CML has collected quarterly figures on arrears and possessions since 1997, 
provided to data contributors and government and used for internal purposes, and they have been 
published on a quarterly basis since 2008.  
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In addition, there are data from the Ministry of Justice, for possessions only. The MoJ data on 
court actions for mortgage possession in England and Wales begin in 1986, and are quarterly 
from 1987.  These data have the advantage of being available at the regional and sub-regional 
level, unlike all the other sources, but do not include „voluntary‟ possessions cases37.   
 
 
A2.  Comparing and contrasting the data from the different providers 
 
 
Apart from their differing availability of historical data, the FSA and CML‟s published data 
on arrears and possessions employ different definitions, and are compiled from different sets 
of borrowers. Thus, these data are not directly comparable, and trends may differ.  
 
According to the CML, their data refer only to CML members, who they believe account for 
98 percent of the outstanding stock of first mortgages secured on UK residential housing.
38
 
The CML currently has 136 members (banks, building societies and other mortgage lenders) 
and 72 associates (related businesses that have an interest in the mortgage market). Their data 
are sometimes revised, with resubmission of earlier figures from lenders, new lenders 
reporting, and when they get “better information about rates of growth and performance in 
different parts of the market”. A measurement issue thus arises. One of the bigger recent 
revisions concerned 2007 possessions and arrears data. Missing data from some smaller 
members were grossed up to obtain an estimate for all members and it was discovered that 
default and delinquency rates for these lenders in niche markets tended to be somewhat 
higher.  As a result, the sample representation was extended to give a more complete picture, 
resulting in upward revision of default and delinquency rates. Thus, in the arrears data, CML 
cautions that “care should be taken when looking at changes over time as lenders newly 
reporting figures may distort comparisons”. 
 
The FSA data cover all regulated firms, and also take account of multiple loans concerning a 
single property. Many mortgages are split into multiple accounts (for example one account for 
an interest-only segment, another for a repayment section for a part-and-part mortgage). The 
FSA figures involve a degree of „double counting‟ in that a borrower can have arrears both on 
the first loan and on the second loan. As a fraction of the total number of accounts, however, 
the FSA count of cases in arrears or flowing into possession can be lower or higher than the 
CML figures, depending on whether arrears or possessions rates are higher or lower on 
second loans. Table A2 illustrates this. The CML count of first mortgages outstanding was 
11.7m at the end of 2008, while the FSA count of the number of loan accounts was 15.4m.  In 
terms of proportions of loans, the two sets of arrears figures are reasonably close, though 
CML estimates a higher proportion are 10 percent or more in arrears.  However, the CML 
arrears proportions in the 2.5 to 5 percent range have shown a more rapid rise in 2008. 
 
For the proportion of possessions, the FSA figures are lower than the CML‟s but show a more 
rapid rate of increase in 2008, possibly because possessions rates are rising among second and 
third loans because the households taking out such loans are more heavily indebted and so 
                                                 
37
 Instances where a property is surrendered after a claim is made by the lender or a court order is 
granted but before such an order is enforced are categorised as voluntary possessions by some lenders 
and will be included in MoJ mortgage possession court statistics. 
38
 This has not always been so.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when CML membership covered a 
smaller fraction of the industry, it is believed that CML estimates of possessions made an allowance for 
non-CML members.  To the extent that CML used a simple grossing up factor, not taking into account 
the higher possessions rates for non-members, it is likely that CML possessions estimates for the early 
1990s may have understated the true incidence of possessions at that time. As of  May 2010, after the 
drafting of this paper, the CML began to publish estimates grossed up to be representative of the entire 
first charge mortgage market, and revised their arrears and possessions  series accordingly back to Q1 
2009.  
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more likely to default on their loans. It is also possible that the small fraction of lenders not 
covered by CML data have experienced a higher rate of repossessions than CML members. 
This could be because these lenders specialise in non-prime lending. 
 
A recent view from the FSA
39
 is that the main reason for the recent gap between CML and 
FSA-MLAR possession statistics is due to the different treatment of Buy-to-Let Receiver of 
Rent cases. FSA data differ from the CML data through coverage only of loans made 
by regulated firms and coverage of second charge loans, but the CML data also exclude Buy-
to-Let mortgages for which a receiver of rent (RoR) has been appointed, whereas the FSA 
includes these cases. Analysis by the FSA of the possessions data produced since 2007 by the 
Finance and Leasing Association (FLA) supports this view. Moreover, analysis by the FSA 
suggests that the majority of possessions in the unregulated market arise from Buy-to-Let 
loans (including RoR) rather than second charge loans.  
 
The FSA further disaggregates loan data and contrasts default and delinquency rates on 
securitised and non-securitised loans, Table A3, adding considerably to previously available 
information. Except for the highest levels of arrears (over 10 percent of the loan), it shows 
that arrears rates for securitised loans are more than double those for non-securitised loans.  It 
also shows more rapid rates of increase of default and deliquency rates among securitised 
loans. 
 
The FSA also produces very useful information on distributions of loan to value ratios, see 
Table A4. CML no longer put data of this kind into the public domain.  These show dramatic 
falls between mid 2007 and mid-2009 in the proportions of more exposed loans, with LTVs 
over 90 percent and over 95 percent respectively.  Their cross-tabulation of loan proportions 
with high LTVs and high loan to income ratios also shows a sharp decline.  These declines 
reflect a mix of „credit crunch‟ effects and of greater caution by lenders in view of falling 
house prices and rising unemployment.  
 
A3. Gaps in coverage of the available data on mortgage possessions and arrears  
 
Gaps in coverage should be considered from two points of view.  One is from the short-run 
perspective of tracking the detail of what is happening both to understand the forces at work 
and to have some hope of finding evidence on the effects of policy interventions.  The other is 
from the perspective of long-run comparisons and modelling.  The latter is important since 
analysis of the previous crisis and the subsequent recovery can offer important guidance on 
what might be expected in the future, controlling for different economic circumstances. 
 
1. The most obvious gap in the data is the absence of sub-national estimates, except for 
county court actions and orders. There is no fundamental reason why mortgage lenders should 
not be able to classify arrears and possessions cases by region or sub-region. House prices, 
incomes, and unemployment and their changes differ considerably by location so that the 
evolution of arrears and possessions cases is likely to differ considerably by location, see 
Chart 1, on the regional distribution of court claims for possessions in 2010, quarter 1. The 
FSA view is that: „All regulatory reporting by authorised firms is covered by the FSA 
Handbook. Any changes to reporting are subject to formal appraisal, and public consultation 
with affected firms, and cost benefit analysis.‟ However, ideally, the FSA could additionally 
classify arrears and possessions cases by post code groupings or sub-regions. Not only is this 
of significance for local government, but such variations will illuminate the relative 
importance of the drivers of payment difficulties. This may help to disentangle the relative 
contributions of interest rates, policy interventions and changes over time in the quality of 
lending. 
 
                                                 
39
 We are grateful to John Longbottom of the FSA for drawing our attention to these details. 
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2. A second important gap is the absence of information on the year in which the mortgage 
was first issued (the vintage of the mortgage). The year of origination of the mortgage is used 
by some lenders who classify their own data in this way; but it would be useful if all lenders 
could supply their data to the FSA or CML in this form.  The proportion of mortgages of a 
given year‟s vintage going into possession gives important clues on the quality of lending in 
that year, and tends to give more stable models and better predictability. A good example of 
what might be done is shown in Chart 2. This shows 90+ days arrears on UK non-conforming 
residential mortgage-backed securities, by vintage.  Jonathan Livingstone of Moodys.com has 
constructed estimates of possessions rates on UK residential mortgages by year of origination 
of the loan using vintage data for a subset of UK lenders.  Livingstone (2006) covers 
possessions data for the years 1985 to 2003, and demonstrates the strong association between 
original loan to value and subsequent possessions rates.   Reliable and timely data of this type 
covering the full set of lenders reporting to the FSA would be of great value in understanding 
variations in possessions rates and producing forecast scenarios. This should make it possible 
to better link data on distributions of loan to value from the Survey of Regulated Mortgages 
with subsequent possessions rates. 
 
3.  Compared to the US, where micro data tracking individual mortgages from origination to 
subsequent non-performance or performance are widely available for analysis, see Section 2.2 
and Gerrardi et al. (2008), few comparable data have been released in the UK
40
.  Given the 
government stake in major UK mortgage lenders, it would be useful to extract such data for 
analysis, and this would also be a valuable check on analyses with aggregated data. 
4. Better information on market shares by types of mortgages issued would be an advantage 
for analysis with aggregate or micro data.  For example, FSA data show that default rates for 
securitised loans are substantially higher than for non-securitised loans and there are Bank of 
England estimates of the market share of securitized mortgages.
41
  Additional historical data 
on the market shares both for new mortgages and for the stock of outstanding mortgages 
classified by several categories would be helpful before the 2007Q1 date at which the FSA 
published data begin. The categories might also include regulated and unregulated, whether to 
borrowers with impaired credit histories or not, whether interest only, whether self-certified or 
not, and whether low initial „teaser rates‟ were on offer.  These all serve as partial indicators 
of „quality of lending‟. 
5. Other important indicators of „quality of lending‟ are distributions of loan to value and loan 
to income or debt service ratios.  The FSA have produced tabulations back to 2007Q1 of LTV 
distributions.  In principle, these can be connected with tabulations from the Regulated 
Mortgage Survey (RMS) back to mid 2005, and further back to tabulations from the Survey of 
Mortgage Lenders and its predecessor.  Comparability problems of the different surveys were 
discussed in Section 3.3. Further research on matching data from the RMS and SML beyond 
the start made by Tatch (2006) would be helpful. 
6. The range of mortgage interest rates now published, for example on the Bank of England 
website, has expanded greatly.  What is missing, however, from official data bases is a long 
historical record of a broadly representative rate based on an average of actual payments, both 
for new and existing customers, and including special offers and their discontinuation, when 
relevant. ONS used to publish the average of building society rates on outstanding mortgages 
under the code AJNL. From 1998, the average for banks and building societies was published 
but appears to have been discontinued. The FSA now produce excellent information on 
                                                 
40
 Citadel Capital Advisors have analysed a subset of the non-prime market using micro data in the 
public domain from the Trustees of several mortgage backed securities originators including RMAC, 
Lehman Bros, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch. 
41
 Also see the Crosby Report for information on the growth of mortgage backed securities in the UK 
and other countries. 
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interest rates, see Table A5. It shows distributions of spreads above base rate and average 
rates both on existing loans and paid by new borrowers. Such information taken back in time 
would provide useful material for modelers and others attempting to understand the dynamics 
of mortgage defaults. Of course, the monthly payment is not the only cost borne by mortgage 
holders, (there could be setting up costs, penalty costs, and insurance indemnity premia, for 
example), and the interest element and the repayment element of a typical monthly payment 
need to be treated separately.  Historical data on average setting up costs appear not to be 
available. 
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Chart 1: Possession orders by district 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice, http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/stats-mort-land-q1-
2010.pdf 
 57 
Chart 2: Quality of lending 
 
Chart 1.20  90+ days arrears on UK non-conforming 
residential mortgage-backed securities, by vintage
Source:  Lehman Brothers.
Source: Financial Stability Review, BOE, October, 2007. 
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Table A1:  Typology of Published Estimates on Mortgage Arrears and Possessions    
Source Category Frequency and historical samples Units and seasonal 
adjustment 
Definition of coverage 
  Annual Quarterly Bi-annual   
LOANS DATA 
CML Mortgages outstanding        1969 
onward   
Published: 
2008q1 onward 
Unpublished: 
1999q1-2007q4   
1981:h2 onward Reported as number at 
end period 
For BTL only, CML estimates lending figures 
where these are not reported, see below. 
CML BTL properties: mortgages 
outstanding       
1998 
onward   
2008q1 onward 
 
2005:h2 onward 
FSA Number of loan accounts 2007 
onward 
2007q1 onward 
 
2008q1 onward 
 
Reported as number at 
end period 
 
ARREARS DATA 
 
CML data:  no. of households more than x months in arrears and  no. of households whose arrears total x% or more of the total outstanding balance on their mortgage 
CML Arrears >6-12 months     1969 
onward    
Published: 
2008q1 onward 
Unpublished: 
1999q1-2007q4   
 
1981:h2 onward Reported as number at 
end period and as % of 
all loans end period. 
 
Arrears figures are 
rounded to the nearest 
100. 
 
Figures are not 
seasonally adjusted. 
Definition: All first charge loans held by CML 
members, both regulated and unregulated, are 
included. This includes Buy-to-Let (BTL). Non-
CML members are excluded Other secured 
lending is also excluded. Properties in 
possession are not counted as arrears. BTL 
mortgages when a receiver or rent has been 
appointed are not counted as arrears. 
 
Sample: Estimates from a sample of CML 
members, “grossed up” to represent the 
membership as a whole. Not clear how 
representative this sample is or how it changes 
over time. For BTL only, CML estimates 
lending figures where these are not reported. 
 
Members: Drawn from Scotland, Wales and 
England. Not clear on whether the coverage is 
CML Arrears >12 months        1982 
onward    
1982:h1 onward 
CML Arrears >3-6 months       1994 
onward    
1994:h2 onward 
CML Arrears >3 months         1994 
onward   
1994:h2 onward 
CML Arrears 2.5%<5% 1994 
onward 
1994:h2 onward 
CML Arrears 5%<7.5% 1993 
onward 
1993:h1 onward 
CML Arrears 7.5%<10% 1993 
onward 
1993:h1 onward 
CML Arrears >=10% 1993 
onward 
1993:h1 onward 
CML BTL properties: arrears >3months  1998 
onward    
2006q3 onward    1998:h2 onward 
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Source Category Frequency and historical samples Units and seasonal 
adjustment 
Definition of coverage 
CML BTL properties in arrears with 
ROR newly appointed, in period 
2006 
onward    
2006q3 onward 2005:h2 onward equally good in each region and over time. 
CML BTL properties in arrears with 
ROR acting on lender‟s behalf, 
end period 
2005 
onward    
2006q3 onward 2005:h2 onward 
 
FSA data:  number of individual loan accounts in arrears 
FSA New cases in quarter  2007q1 onward - Reported as number of 
loan accounts, amount 
in £m, balance 
outstanding in £m, or 
new cases as % total 
stock 
 
Figures are not 
seasonally adjusted. 
Disaggregation: all FSA data for residential 
loans to individuals in the column 2 are 
separately presented in six different categories:  
A. Securitised loans 
1. Regulated + Non-regulated 
2. Non-regulated 
3. Regulated 
B. Unsecuritised and securitised loans  
4. Regulated + Non-regulated 
5. Non-regulated 
6. Regulated 
 
Definition: All first charge loans, both regulated 
and unregulated, held by firms regulated by the 
FSA, are included. Firms not regulated by the 
FSA, are excluded. Second and subsequent 
charge loans are also included (i.e. any loan 
secured on a property for which a separate first 
charge loan already exists). Hence, Buy-to-Let 
mortgages (BTL) are covered, but not if 
extended by unregulated firms (many second 
charge lenders are not regulated). Some further 
advance loans are also included from first 
charge lenders. Properties in possession are 
counted as arrears, see previous column.  
 
FSA End of quarter arrears  2007q1 onward - 
FSA 1.5<2% in arrears 1  2007q1 onward - Reported as number in 
arrears, % all loans, 
balance in arrears, or  % 
total loan balance 
 
Figures are not 
seasonally adjusted. 
 
Total includes cases in 
possession 
FSA 2.5<5% in arrears  2007q1 onward - 
FSA 5<7.5% in arrears  2007q1 onward - 
FSA 7.5<10% in arrears  2007q1 onward - 
FSA >10% in arrears  2007q1 onward - 
FSA Total in arrears  2007q1 onward - 
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Source Category Frequency and historical samples Units and seasonal 
adjustment 
Definition of coverage 
Note 
1
 lower threshold than for CML. 
Note: contrasts with the CML data which refers 
to no. of borrowers in arrears: here it is no. of 
loan accounts in arrears. 
 
Sample:  100% of regulated firms. 
Regulated firms: UK-wide. 
POSSESSIONS DATA 
 
CML data: number of possessions 
CML Properties taken into possession in 
period 
1970 
onward 
Published: 
2008q1 onward 
Unpublished: 
1999q1-2007q4   
  
1982:h1 onward Reported as number at 
end period and as % all 
loans end period. 
 
Rounded possessions 
figures to the nearest 
100. 
 
Figures are not 
seasonally adjusted. 
 
Definition: All first charge loans held by CML 
members, both regulated and unregulated, are 
included. This includes Buy-to-Let (BTL). Non-
CML members are excluded Other secured 
lending is also excluded. Voluntary 
repossessions are included, and defined as  
cases in which the borrower decides to give up 
the property before legal action for possession 
has been completed (CML, Nov.2009), as well 
as cases that had not gone to court.  
 
Sample: Estimates from a sample of CML 
members, “grossed up” to represent the 
membership as a whole. Not clear how 
representative this sample is or how it changes 
over time. For BTL only, CML estimates 
lending figures where these are not reported. . In 
May 2010, the CML produced estimates grossed 
up to be representative of the entire first charge 
mortgage market and revised their data series 
back to Q1 2009. 
 
Members: Drawn from Scotland, Wales and 
CML Properties in possession at end 
period 
1990- 
onward  
1990:h2 onward  
CML Voluntary possessions 1994 
onward 
1994h1 onward  
CML Possessed properties sold in 
period 
1997 
onward   
1997:h1 onward Number  
 
CML BTL Properties taken into 
possession in period 
2006 
onward    
2006q3 onward   2005:h2 onward  Reported as number at 
end period or % all 
loans 
 
CML BTL Properties in possession at 
end period 
2005 
onward    
2006q3 onward    2005:h2 onward  
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Source Category Frequency and historical samples Units and seasonal 
adjustment 
Definition of coverage 
England. Not clear on whether the coverage is 
equally good in each region and over time. 
 
MoJ data: possession claims issued or orders made in the county courts 
Possession actions England and Wales 
MoJ Actions entered (number of 
possession claim issued in the 
county courts) 
 
There are also data on: 
No. of Landlord possession claims  
1987 
onward 
 
1989q2 onward 
See below for 
new  
disaggregated 
category. 
- Both seasonally 
adjusted and non-
seasonally adjusted  
figures are given 
(adjustment using X12 
ARIMA). 
 
Data are disaggregated 
into court regions back 
to 1987. 
 
Comparability over time 
is affected by new court 
jurisdictions being 
incorporated. 
Mortgage data include all types of lenders 
whether local authority or private (e.g. banks 
and building societies). Landlord data include 
all types of landlord whether social or private 
sector, and cover actions made using both the 
standard and accelerated possession procedures.  
Voluntary repossessions are not included, 
except insofar that the property is surrendered 
after a claim is made by the lender or a court 
order is granted.  
 
Note: The mortgage possession figures do not 
indicate how many houses have actually been 
repossessed through the courts. Repossessions 
can occur without a court order being made 
while not all court orders result in repossession. 
 
 
MoJ Number of possession orders 
made (incl. suspended orders) 
There are also data on: 
No. of Landlord possession orders 
made (incl. suspended orders)  
1987-2008 
See below 
for change 
of 
definition. 
1990q1-2009q2 
See below for 
definitional 
change and 
new  
disaggregated 
category. 
- 
MoJ Orders suspended 1990 
onward    
1990q1 onward  - 
MoJ Charging orders applications 
made 
2001 
onward  
 - 
MoJ Charging orders granted  2001 
onward 
 - 
Possession actions Northern Ireland 
NI 
Court 
Service 
Writs and summonses  1991-2007 1991q1-2007q4    -   
Definitional differences in MoJ data introduced from August 2009 
MoJ Number of possession orders 
made (mortgage and landlord) 
1999 
onward 
2004q1 onward 
 published; 
1999q1 onward 
 on request 
- New, additional local 
authority level 
breakdown for the 
„orders‟ and „claims‟ 
Redefinition to: 
 
Number of possession claims that lead to an 
order.  
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Source Category Frequency and historical samples Units and seasonal 
adjustment 
Definition of coverage 
series, with the 
disaggregation based on 
the physical location of 
the property which is 
the subject of the 
possession action. 
This will eliminate all instances of multiple 
orders on the same claim. It will not eliminate 
all instances of multiple orders on a single 
household: a homeowner in arrears on more 
than one mortgage loan account could be 
subject to more than one claim (though this is 
likely to be a very small proportion). 
MoJ Actions entered (number of 
possession claims issued in the 
county courts) 
1987 
onward 
 
1987q1 onward 
 
 No definitional change. 
 
FSA: number of individual loan accounts in possession 
FSA New possessions in quarter  2007q1 onward - Number. 
 
Figures are not 
seasonally adjusted. 
 
Definition: All first charge loans, both regulated 
and unregulated, held by firms regulated by the 
FSA, are included. Firms not regulated by the 
FSA, are excluded. Second and subsequent 
charge loans are also included. Hence, Buy-to-
Let mortgages (BTL) are covered, but not if 
extended by unregulated firms (many second 
charge lenders are not regulated). Voluntary 
repossessions are included. 
 
Sample:  100% of regulated firms. 
Regulated firms: UK-wide. 
Note: contrasts with the CML data which refers 
to no. of borrowers subject to possession: here it 
is no. of loan accounts in possession 
FSA Possessions cases sold in quarter  2007q1 onward - 
FSA Stock at end- quarter  2007q1 onward - 
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Table A2:  Comparison of FSA and CML data on arrears and possession, 2007Q1-2008Q4 
 2007-Q1
1
  2007-Q2
1
 2007-Q3  2007-Q4 2008-Q1  2008-Q2 2008-Q3  2008-Q4 
FSA 
All FSA-regulated members: for securitized+non-securitised, regulated+non-regulated 
 % of number of loan accounts 
1.5 < 2.5% in arrears 0.59  0.59 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.69 0.75 
2.5 < 5 in arrears 0.57  0.58 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.71 0.80 
5 < 7.5 in arrears 0.20  0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.31 
7.5 < 10 in arrears 0.09  0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.13 
Over 10 in arrears 0.19  0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.25 
TOTAL arrears 1.64 1.65 1.68 1.76 1.8 1.86 2 2.24 
New possessions in Q
2
 0.043  0.042 0.044 0.052 0.059 0.071 0.086 0.084 
Number of loan accounts 15,046,772 15,473,936 15,475,000 15,505,441 15,614,450 15,607,195 15,643,767 15,536,598 
CML 
Data from sample of CML members (“grossed up”) 
 %  of mortgages outstanding 
2.5 < 5 in arrears 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.68 0.75 0.91 
5 < 7.5 in arrears 0.63 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.32 
s7.5 < 10 in arrears 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.13 
Over 10 in arrears 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.21 
TOTAL arrears 1.52 1.04 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.18 1.28 1.57 
Possessions in period 0.053 0.055 0.051 0.059 0.072 0.085 0.095 0.089 
Number of mortgages 
outstanding 
11,793,400 11,841,000 11,846,500 11,852,000 11,787,000 11,763,000 11,718,000 11,667,000 
Sources: As above. CML data quarternalised through interpolation by ourselves.  
Notes:  
1 
The 2007Q1 FSA figure is taken from the published October statistics, and the 2007Q 2 figure from the published January statistics. The later figures are from the published 
March, 2009 statistics. The earlier figures may since have been revised but are not publicly available. 
2 
Note this is different from FSA reporting. They report the stock at end quarter as a percentage of number of loan accounts.  We report the flow of new possessions in the 
quarter as a percentage of number of loan accounts. Note that the totals figure reported by FSA including possessions (defined as end of quarter stocks) can be misleading. 
This is because the stock of possessions depends on the speed with which mortgage lenders sell those properties. This is not closely connected with the default rate.  
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Table A3:  Analysis of FSA arrears data for categories of securitised and of non-securitised loans 
 2007-Q1
1
 2007-Q2 
1
 2007-Q3  2007-Q4 2008-Q1  2008-Q2 2008-Q3  2008-Q4 
FSA        All FSA-regulated members: non-securitised, regulated+non-regulated 
 %  of number of loans 
1.5 < 2.5 in 
arrears 0.48 0.48 
0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.61 
2.5 < 5 in 
arrears 0.46 0.46 
0.47 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.55 0.63 
5 < 7.5 in 
arrears 0.17 0.17 
0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.24 
7.5 < 10 in 
arrears 0.08 0.08 
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 
Over 10 in 
arrears 0.19 0.18 
0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.24 
TOTAL arrears 1.38 1.37 1.42 1.45 1.47 1.51 1.61 1.83 
New possessions in Q
2
 0.028 0.027 0.029 0.033 0.038 0.045 0.054 0.054 
Number of loan accounts 12,883,218 13,127,061 13,054,664 13,256,525 13,434,808 13,332,125 13,380,386 13,137,190 
FSA        All FSA members: for securitized, regulated+non-regulated 
 %  of number of loans 
1.5 < 2.5 in arrears 1.25 1.19 1.13 1.31 1.33 1.36 1.49 1.51 
2.5 < 5 in arrears 1.26 1.23 1.20 1.36 1.44 1.47 1.68 1.77 
5 < 7.5 in arrears 0.40 0.4 0.43 0.47 0.51 0.53 0.62 0.67 
7.5 < 10 in arrears 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.26 
Over 10 in arrears 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.29 
TOTAL arrears 3.21 3.14 3.12 3.56 3.74 3.83 4.34 4.5 
New possessions in Q
2
 0.131 0.124 0.126 0.167 0.186 0.222 0.276 0.246 
Number of loan accounts 2,163,554 2,346,875 2,420,336 2,248,916 2,179,642 2,275,070 2,263,383 2,399,408 
Sources: As above. 
Notes: 
1
The 2007Q1 FSA figure is taken from the published October statistics, and the 2007Q 2 figure from the published January statistics. The later figures are from the 
published March, 2009 statistics. The earlier figures may since have been revised but are not publicly available. 
2 
Note this is different from FSA reporting. They report the stock at end quarter as a percentage of number of loan accounts.  
We report the flow of new possessions in the quarter as a percentage of number of loan accounts. 
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Table A4:  Loan to value ratios, FSA data 
 2007-Q1
1
  2007-Q2
1
 2007-Q3  2007-Q4 2008-Q1  2008-Q2 2008-Q3  2008-Q4 
FSA 
All FSA-regulated members: for non-securitized, regulated+non-regulated 
  % of value of loans 
LTV 
< = 75 48.62 47.59 48.62 49.54 55.17 55.91 64.37 65.21 
Over 75 < = 90 37.24 37.65 37.05 37.14 34.33 33.70 29.10 28.76 
Over 90 < = 95 8.52 9.29 8.27 7.78 6.25 7.20 5.06 4.56 
Over 95 5.62 5.47 6.06 5.54 4.24 3.19 1.47 1.47 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
         
High LTV and High Income multiple (All over 90) 
Single: 3.50 x or 
more 3.11 3.17 3.06 2.83 2.27 2.09 1.23 1.11 
Joint : 2.75 x or 
more 5.67 6.04 5.79 5.65 4.66 4.98 2.99 2.60 
Total HIM 8.78 9.20 8.85 8.48 6.92 7.07 4.22 3.71 
Source: FSA. 
Notes:  
1 
The 2007Q1 FSA figure is taken from the published October statistics, and the 2007Q 2 figure from the published January statistics. The later figures are from the published 
March, 2009 statistics. The earlier figures may since have been revised but are not publicly available. 
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Table A5:  Interest rates, FSA data 
 2007-Q1
1
 2007-Q2
1
 2007-Q3  2007-Q4 2008-Q1  2008-Q2 2008-Q3  2008-Q4 
FSA 
All FSA-regulated members: for non-securitised, regulated+non-regulated 
   
Percent of business at fixed rates 
Gross advances 64.79 67.45 67.11 57.04 45.88 56.37 52.69 43.75 
Balances outstanding 47.71 50.51 52.78 53.05 51.43 51.07 50.83 48.13 
Percent of business above BBR 
Gross advances 
Less than 2 above 96.95 97.04 96.85 95.66 95.13 94.92 92.44 44.48 
2 < 3  above 2.20 2.29 2.41 3.27 3.52 3.93 6.40 19.67 
3 < 4  above 0.30 0.17 0.24 0.55 0.67 0.65 0.73 18.70 
4 or more above 0.55 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.68 0.49 0.43 17.15 
Balances outstanding 
Less than 2 above 91.96 92.34 92.61 92.11 91.73 90.55 89.61 36.17 
2 < 3  above 7.37 7.00 6.56 7.09 7.45 8.65 9.58 28.48 
3 < 4  above 0.34 0.33 0.37 0.43 0.39 0.43 0.44 25.60 
4 or more above 0.34 0.33 0.47 0.38 0.43 0.37 0.37 9.75 
Overall weighted average interest rates 
Gross advances 
Fixed rate loans 5.35 5.54 5.77 6.01 5.92 5.82 6.12 6.05 
Variable rate loans 5.88 6.05 6.25 6.14 5.87 5.83 6.11 4.33 
All loans 5.53 5.71 5.93 6.07 5.90 5.83 6.11 5.08 
Balances outstanding 
Fixed rate loans 5.23 5.20 5.30 5.42 5.52 5.59 5.70 5.71 
Variable rate loans 6.23 6.43 6.64 6.55 6.15 5.95 6.03 4.12 
All loans 5.75 5.81 5.93 5.95 5.83 5.77 5.86 4.89 
Sources: FSA, data
1 
from particular years as in above tables.  
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ANNEX 2:   Forecast scenarios: underlying assumptions 2009q4-2013q4   
 
 SCEN1 SCEN2 SCEN3 SCEN4 SCEN5 SCEN6 SCEN1 SCEN2 SCEN3 SCEN4 SCEN5 SCEN6 
 Unemployment rate  House price  
Date UPBASE UPHG UPLG UPBASEALT UPXPOS UPXNEG PHBASE PHHG PHLG PHBASEALT PHXPOS PHXNEG 
Dec-09 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.6 8.4 9.2 166.1 166.1 166.0 166.0 166.0 166.0 
Mar-10 8.5 8.4 8.6 9.0 8.7 9.9 164.4 166.1 164.4 166.0 166.0 161.6 
Jun-10 8.6 8.4 8.7 9.3 9.0 10.6 163.2 166.1 162.7 166.0 169.0 157.2 
Sep-10 8.6 8.4 8.8 9.5 9.3 11.1 163.2 167.8 161.9 166.0 172.0 152.8 
Dec-10 8.6 8.3 9.0 9.5 9.3 11.4 163.3 169.5 161.9 168.1 175.0 152.8 
Mar-11 8.5 8.2 9.0 9.5 9.3 11.4 163.4 171.1 161.9 170.2 177.9 152.8 
Jun-11 8.5 8.2 9.0 9.5 9.0 11.4 163.7 172.9 162.1 172.3 180.9 152.8 
Sep-11 8.4 8.1 8.9 9.5 8.6 11.4 164.0 174.8 162.3 174.3 183.9 152.8 
Dec-11 8.2 7.9 8.7 9.5 8.2 11.4 164.5 176.9 162.6 176.4 186.8 152.8 
Mar-12 8.0 7.7 8.6 9.3 7.6 11.0 165.1 179.0 163.1 178.5 189.8 152.8 
Jun-12 7.9 7.4 8.5 9.0 7.0 10.7 166.1 181.3 163.7 180.5 192.8 154.7 
Sep-12 7.6 7.1 8.3 8.3 6.4 10.3 167.4 183.8 164.7 182.6 195.7 156.6 
Dec-12 7.5 7.0 8.2 7.6 5.8 9.9 169.1 186.6 166.0 184.7 198.7 158.5 
Mar-13 7.3 6.8 8.0 6.9 5.2 9.6 171.1 189.6 167.3 186.8 201.7 160.3 
Jun-13 7.1 6.6 7.8 6.4 4.8 9.2 173.3 192.6 168.9 188.8 204.7 162.2 
Sep-13 7.0 6.5 7.7 6.0 4.75 8.9 175.8 195.7 170.4 190.9 207.6 164.1 
Dec-13 6.9 6.4 7.6 5.6 4.75 8.5 178.2 198.8 171.9 193.0 210.6 166.0 
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SCEN1 SCEN2 SCEN3 SCEN4 SCEN5 SCEN6 SCEN1 SCEN2 SCEN3 SCEN4 SCEN5 SCEN6 
Real income Mortgage interest rate  
PEDYBASE PEDYHG PEDYLG PEDYBASEALT PEDYXPOS PEDYXNEG ARBMBASE ARBMHG ARBMLG ARBMBASEALT ARBMXPOS ARBMXNEG 
213862 213862 213648 213969 214290 213456 3.81 3.81 3.81 4.00 4.00 4.00 
214076 214290 213434 214375 215683 213050 3.81 4.00 3.81 4.40 4.00 4.86 
214504 214933 213434 214783 217085 212645 3.81 4.10 3.81 4.60 4.00 5.20 
215148 215792 213648 215191 218496 212645 3.81 4.20 3.81 4.80 4.00 5.55 
216008 216871 214075 215600 219916 212645 3.81 4.50 3.81 5.00 4.00 5.90 
216980 218064 214610 216893 221895 212645 3.91 4.60 3.81 5.20 4.19 6.25 
218065 219372 215254 218195 223892 212858 4.11 4.80 3.90 5.40 4.37 6.60 
219373 220908 216115 219504 225907 213071 4.21 4.90 4.00 5.60 4.56 6.66 
220799 222454 217196 220821 227940 213284 4.41 5.10 4.10 5.80 4.74 6.72 
222345 224012 218390 222146 229992 213817 4.61 5.30 4.30 6.00 4.93 6.78 
223901 225692 219592 223479 232062 214352 4.71 5.40 4.40 6.20 5.11 6.84 
225524 227497 220909 224820 234150 214888 4.91 5.60 4.60 6.25 5.30 6.90 
227553 229545 222235 226168 236258 215425 5.11 5.70 4.80 6.30 5.30 6.96 
229602 231611 223568 227525 238384 215963 5.21 5.80 4.90 6.35 5.30 7.02 
231668 233695 224909 228891 240529 216503 5.41 6.00 5.10 6.40 5.30 7.08 
233753 235915 226259 230264 242694 217044 5.61 6.10 5.30 6.45 5.30 7.14 
235915 238156 227616 231646 244878 217587 5.71 6.20 5.40 6.50 5.30 7.20 
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SCEN1 SCEN2 SCEN3 SCEN4/5/6 SCEN1 SCEN2 SCEN3 SCEN4 SCEN5 SCEN6 
Price level  Mortgage lending stock    
PCBASE PCHG PCLG PCALT AMWTBASE AMWTHG AMWTLG AMWTALT AMWTPOS AMWTNEG 
1.095 1.097 1.095 1.099 1228872 1228872 1228872 1228872 1229994 1233993 
1.101 1.103 1.097 1.104 1232437 1233664 1229978 1232437 1237190 1241403 
1.099 1.107 1.097 1.110 1237133 1239586 1232192 1237133 1246097 1248858 
1.101 1.111 1.099 1.115 1242578 1246280 1235149 1242578 1256191 1256357 
1.103 1.116 1.101 1.121 1248814 1253757 1238854 1248814 1267497 1263902 
1.105 1.121 1.103 1.127 1255972 1262158 1243438 1255972 1280235 1271491 
1.108 1.127 1.106 1.132 1264304 1271750 1249158 1264304 1294830 1279127 
1.111 1.133 1.109 1.138 1273797 1282560 1256028 1273797 1311339 1286808 
1.114 1.140 1.112 1.144 1284469 1294103 1264821 1284469 1329042 1294535 
1.118 1.147 1.116 1.149 1296263 1307044 1274307 1296263 1348977 1302309 
1.124 1.154 1.121 1.155 1309160 1321421 1284501 1309160 1371235 1310129 
1.130 1.161 1.126 1.161 1323128 1336618 1296062 1323128 1394889 1317996 
1.137 1.168 1.131 1.167 1338123 1352657 1310318 1338123 1419997 1325911 
1.144 1.175 1.137 1.173 1353772 1369565 1324732 1353772 1446622 1333873 
1.151 1.182 1.143 1.178 1369788 1387370 1339304 1369788 1474831 1341883 
1.158 1.189 1.148 1.184 1386022 1405406 1354706 1386022 1503591 1349941 
1.165 1.196 1.154 1.190 1402473 1423676 1370285 1402473 1532911 1358047 
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SCEN1/2/3 SCEN4/5/6 SCEN1/2/3 SCEN4/5/6 
Population level  Number of outstanding mortgages  
POPWR POPWRALT MORTINT MORTINT 
38297 38304 11592592 11592592 
38333 38342 11604185 11604185 
38368 38380 11615789 11615789 
38432 38419 11627405 11627405 
38496 38457 11639032 11639032 
38560 38496 11650671 11650671 
38624 38534 11662322 11662322 
38671 38573 11673984 11673984 
38719 38611 11685658 11685658 
38766 38650 11697344 11697344 
38814 38689 11709041 11709041 
38860 38727 11720750 11720750 
38908 38766 11732471 11732471 
38955 38805 11744203 11744203 
39001 38844 11755947 11755947 
39052 38882 11767703 11767703 
39102 38921 11779471 11779471 
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ANNEX 3:  Forecast scenarios and underlying assumptions for repossessions and 
arrears 
 
The different scenarios are summarized in Table 5, using underlying data in Annex 2. 
 
SCENARIO 1: Base scenario 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
LOG POSSESSIONS, LOG ARREARS - Out of Sample Simulation
LPOSSCML 
LARR12MCML 
LARR6MCML 
LVPOSP 
LPOSSCML_H 
LARR12MCML_H 
LARR6MCML_H 
LVPOSP_H 
 
 
KEY: Order of coloured lines: highest to lowest: LARR6MCML, LARR12MCML, LPOSSCML, 
LVPOSP 
2000 2010
5
6
7
8
9
UP 
2000 2010
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
ARBM 
2000 2010
3
4
RMORTY 
2000 2010
0.15
0.20
0.25 DSR 
2000 2010
100
150
PH 
2000 2010
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
PNEGEQ 
2000 2010
-4
-3
FDERN 
2000 2010
0.2
0.3
0.4
LQF 
2000 2010
-0.2
-0.1
0.0 PSF 
 
 
UP=unemployment, ARBM=mortgage rate; RMORTY=average mortgage over average income; DSR= 
debt service ratio; PH=house prices; PNEGEQ=proportion in negative equity; FDERN=log(pnegeq); 
LQF=lending conditions;  PS=policy function. 
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SCENARIO 1A: Base scenario with policy switched off 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
LOG POSSESSIONS, LOG ARREARS - Out of Sample Simulation
LPOSSCML 
LARR12MCML 
LARR6MCML 
LVPOSP 
LPOSSCML_H 
LARR12MCML_H 
LARR6MCML_H 
LVPOSP_H 
 
 
KEY: Order of coloured lines: highest to lowest: LARR6MCML, LARR12MCML, LPOSSCML, 
LVPOSP 
2000 2010
5
6
7
8
9
UP 
2000 2010
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
ARBM 
2000 2010
3
4
RMORTY 
2000 2010
0.15
0.20
0.25 DSR 
2000 2010
100
150
PH 
2000 2010
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
PNEGEQ 
2000 2010
-4
-3
FDERN 
2000 2010
0.2
0.3
0.4
LQF 
2000 2010
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
PSF 
 
 
UP=unemployment, ARBM=mortgage rate; RMORTY=average mortgage over average income; DSR= 
debt service ratio; PH=house prices; PNEGEQ=proportion in negative equity; FDERN=log(pnegeq); 
LQF=lending conditions;  PS=policy function. 
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SCENARIO 1B: Base scenario with sensitivity testing of the lending quality function 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
LOG POSSESSIONS, LOG ARREARS - Out of Sample Simulation
LPOSSCML 
LARR12MCML 
LARR6MCML 
LVPOSP 
LPOSSCML_H 
LARR12MCML_H 
LARR6MCML_H 
LVPOSP_H 
 
 
 
KEY: Order of coloured lines: highest to lowest: LARR6MCML, LARR12MCML, LPOSSCML, 
LVPOSP 
 
2000 2010
5
6
7
8
9
UP 
2000 2010
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
ARBM 
2000 2010
3
4
RMORTY 
2000 2010
0.15
0.20
0.25 DSR 
2000 2010
100
150
PH 
2000 2010
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
PNEGEQ 
2000 2010
-4
-3
FDERN 
2000 2010
0.2
0.3
0.4
LQF 
2000 2010
-0.2
-0.1
0.0 PSF 
 
 
UP=unemployment, ARBM=mortgage rate; RMORTY=average mortgage over average income; DSR= 
debt service ratio; PH=house prices; PNEGEQ=proportion in negative equity; FDERN=log(pnegeq); 
LQF=lending conditions;  PS=policy function. 
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SCENARIO 2: High growth scenario 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
LOG POSSESSIONS, LOG ARREARS - Out of Sample Simulation
LPOSSCML 
LARR12MCML 
LARR6MCML 
LVPOSP 
LPOSSCML_H 
LARR12MCML_H 
LARR6MCML_H 
LVPOSP_H 
 
 
KEY: Order of coloured lines: highest to lowest: LARR6MCML, LARR12MCML, LPOSSCML, 
LVPOSP 
2000 2010
5
6
7
8
UP 
2000 2010
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
ARBM 
2000 2010
3
4
RMORTY 
2000 2010
0.15
0.20
0.25 DSR 
2000 2010
100
150
200
PH 
2000 2010
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
PNEGEQ 
2000 2010
-4
-3
FDERN 
2000 2010
0.2
0.3
0.4
LQF 
2000 2010
-0.2
-0.1
0.0 PSF 
 
 
UP=unemployment, ARBM=mortgage rate; RMORTY=average mortgage over average income; DSR= 
debt service ratio; PH=house prices; PNEGEQ=proportion in negative equity; FDERN=log(pnegeq); 
LQF=lending conditions;  PS=policy function. 
 75 
SCENARIO 3: Low growth scenario 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
LOG POSSESSIONS, LOG ARREARS - Out of Sample Simulation
LPOSSCML 
LARR12MCML 
LARR6MCML 
LVPOSP 
LPOSSCML_H 
LARR12MCML_H 
LARR6MCML_H 
LVPOSP_H 
 
 
KEY: Order of coloured lines: highest to lowest: LARR6MCML, LARR12MCML, LPOSSCML, 
LVPOSP 
2000 2010
6
8
UP 
2000 2010
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
ARBM 
2000 2010
3
4
RMORTY 
2000 2010
0.15
0.20
0.25 DSR 
2000 2010
100
150
PH 
2000 2010
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
PNEGEQ 
2000 2010
-4
-3
FDERN 
2000 2010
0.2
0.3
0.4
LQF 
2000 2010
-0.2
-0.1
0.0 PSF 
   
 
UP=unemployment, ARBM=mortgage rate; RMORTY=average mortgage over average income; DSR= 
debt service ratio; PH=house prices; PNEGEQ=proportion in negative equity; FDERN=log(pnegeq); 
LQF=lending conditions;  PS=policy function. 
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SCENARIO 4: Base with alternative assumption on interest rates 
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
LOG POSSESSIONS, LOG ARREARS - Out of Sample Simulation
LPOSSCML 
LARR12MCML 
LARR6MCML 
LVPOSP 
LPOSSCML_H 
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KEY: Order of coloured lines: highest to lowest: LARR6MCML, LARR12MCML, LPOSSCML, 
LVPOSP 
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UP=unemployment, ARBM=mortgage rate; RMORTY=average mortgage over average income; DSR= 
debt service ratio; PH=house prices; PNEGEQ=proportion in negative equity; FDERN=log(pnegeq); 
LQF=lending conditions;  PS=policy function. 
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SCENARIO 5: Extreme positive  
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
LOG POSSESSIONS, LOG ARREARS - Out of Sample Simulation
LPOSSCML 
LARR12MCML 
LARR6MCML 
LVPOSP 
LPOSSCML_H 
LARR12MCML_H 
LARR6MCML_H 
LVPOSP_H 
  
 
KEY: Order of coloured lines: highest to lowest: LARR6MCML, LARR12MCML, LPOSSCML, 
LVPOSP 
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UP=unemployment, ARBM=mortgage rate; RMORTY=average mortgage over average income; DSR= 
debt service ratio; PH=house prices; PNEGEQ=proportion in negative equity; FDERN=log(pnegeq); 
LQF=lending conditions;  PS=policy function. 
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SCENARIO 6: Extreme negative  
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KEY: Order of coloured lines: highest to lowest: LARR6MCML, LARR12MCML, LPOSSCML, 
LVPOSP 
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UP=unemployment, ARBM=mortgage rate; RMORTY=average mortgage over average income; DSR= 
debt service ratio; PH=house prices; PNEGEQ=proportion in negative equity; FDERN=log(pnegeq); 
LQF=lending conditions;  PS=policy function. 
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ANNEX 4:  A further selection of forecast results 2009q4-2013q4  
 
SCENARIO 3 
Forecast quarter 
Properties taken into 
possession in 
period/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥12 months/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥6 months/no. 
2009q1 12700 50600 141400 
2009q2 11400 60100 154900 
2009q3 11700 61100 154400 
2009q4 9847 61834 151635 
2010q1 10179 61411 150963 
2010q2 9101 62520 155324 
2010q3 9023 64743 162599 
2010q4 8599 65949 166113 
2011q1 9371 67368 170212 
2011q2 9118 68587 173925 
2011q3 9457 68987 176414 
2011q4 9433 69025 177874 
2012q1 10493 68790 178976 
2012q2 10514 69940 182188 
2012q3 11148 70620 184422 
2012q4 11401 71873 187649 
2013q1 13012 72303 189876 
2013q2 13236 72688 191503 
2013q3 14205 73482 194159 
2013q4 14645 74933 197770 
 
SCENARIO 4 
Forecast quarter 
Properties taken into 
possession in 
period/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥12 months/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥6 months/no. 
2009q1 12700 50600 141400 
2009q2 11400 60100 154900 
2009q3 11700 61100 154400 
2009q4 9847 61478 150941 
2010q1 10155 60218 148755 
2010q2 9194 62059 155188 
2010q3 9484 66242 167423 
2010q4 9584 69050 175643 
2011q1 11120 72303 186243 
2011q2 11480 75853 198177 
2011q3 12468 78319 209056 
2011q4 12731 80989 220935 
2012q1 14231 81492 228534 
2012q2 14027 81623 233903 
2012q3 14536 80310 235347 
2012q4 14396 77748 232519 
2013q1 15714 73422 225524 
2013q2 15190 69494 217445 
2013q3 15298 66227 210082 
2013q4 14705 63005 201085 
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SCENARIO 5 
Forecast quarter 
Properties taken into 
possession in 
period/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥12 months/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥6 months/no. 
2009q1 12700 50600 141400 
2009q2 11400 60100 154900 
2009q3 11700 61100 154400 
2009q4 9847 61054 150125 
2010q1 10162 61138 150491 
2010q2 8877 62555 156057 
2010q3 8522 64678 165012 
2010q4 7854 64775 169037 
2011q1 8147 62962 169848 
2011q2 7542 60345 168726 
2011q3 7492 57418 165908 
2011q4 7253 55696 164567 
2012q1 7969 53371 161409 
2012q2 7905 51754 158833 
2012q3 8363 49710 154708 
2012q4 8534 47865 150254 
2013q1 9592 45205 143962 
2013q2 9526 42800 137143 
2013q3 9839 41061 131636 
2013q4 9620 40140 127491 
 
SCENARIO 1a 
Forecast quarter 
Properties taken into 
possession in 
period/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥12 months/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥6 months/no. 
2009q1 12700 50600 141400 
2009q2 11400 60100 154900 
2009q3 11700 61100 154400 
2009q4 11667 58217 144520 
2010q1 12056 53734 134393 
2010q2 11366 51617 130884 
2010q3 10936 51345 131458 
2010q4 10411 50850 130225 
2011q1 11070 50190 128830 
2011q2 10774 50078 128562 
2011q3 11202 50494 129796 
2011q4 11400 50825 130584 
2012q1 13036 50774 131240 
2012q2 13470 51605 133336 
2012q3 14620 51604 134108 
2012q4 15212 52067 135834 
2013q1 17349 51300 136076 
2013q2 17466 50249 135322 
2013q3 18357 49482 135524 
2013q4 18439 48920 135798 
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SCENARIO 1b 
Forecast quarter 
Properties taken into 
possession in 
period/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥12 months/no. 
Loans in arrears  
≥6 months/no. 
2009q1 12700 50600 141400 
2009q2 11400 60100 154900 
2009q3 11700 61100 154400 
2009q4 10280 70286 163521 
2010q1 10892 75891 171956 
2010q2 10006 81162 183541 
2010q3 9977 86417 196773 
2010q4 9550 89430 204392 
2011q1 10408 91493 209969 
2011q2 10186 93564 215511 
2011q3 10699 96294 222509 
2011q4 10888 98375 227671 
2012q1 12476 100540 232971 
2012q2 12874 104332 240446 
2012q3 13990 106932 245941 
2012q4 14575 110717 253366 
2013q1 16679 113351 259479 
2013q2 16845 114611 262837 
2013q3 17763 116789 268091 
2013q4 17884 118591 272439 
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